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Abstract 
We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials 
from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of 
patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure 
improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget 
authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that 
have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. 
The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown. 
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1 
“One person becomes a mandarin,1 his whole clan benefits.”
-  Vietnamese proverb 
“Even the blind favor the people they know.” 
-  Indian proverb 
“When a man attains power, even his chickens and dogs ascend to heaven.” 
-  Chinese proverb 
I. Introduction 
One common form of public office misuse is favoritism targeted towards 
certain groups. In democracies, favoritism is often associated with pork-barrel 
politics whereby office holders direct resources to specific constituencies in order 
to win their votes and political support for reelection.
2
 In contrast, in authoritarian
regimes where the state is barely accountable to voters, politicians do not gain 
power via competitive elections. To get appointed to an office, they need to please 
their superiors rather than any other group of citizens. Without electoral 
incentives, different questions on favoritism under dictatorship arise. Do 
appointed officials favor any group of citizens, and which ones? Which officials, 
at which ranks, can direct public resources towards favored groups? How is 
favoritism actually exercised? What are the motives of favoritism when elections 
do not matter? Those issues of “who gets what, when, how” are central to the 
study of politics (Lasswell, 1936), hence of high necessity to understanding the 
functioning and development of autocracies. 
In contribution to those questions, this paper investigates hometown favoritism 
under autocracy across a spectrum of office holders, highlighted by the 
1
 The term “mandarin” refers to bureaucrats of the historical Vietnamese monarchist court. 
2
 Since Ferejohn (1974), the large body of evidence of this central topic in the political economy of resource 
distribution, as surveyed in Golden and Min (2013), has mostly considered the quid-pro-quo nature of favoritism towards 
concentrated groups of beneficiaries that provide political support in elections (as modeled by Weingast, Shepsle, and 
Johnsen, 1981). Notable empirical evidence includes Levitt and Snyder (1995) in the U.S; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004), Banerjee and Somanathan (2007), and Keefer and Khemani (2009) in India, and Hicken (2001) in Thailand. In 
addition, Besley, Pande and Rao (2012) shows that elected officials favor their own villages and castes, which in turn 
support them in elections. 
2 
relationship between their new promotions and new public infrastructures in their 
ancestral hometowns. We provide empirical characteristics of hometown 
favoritism regarding its prevalence below the top leadership, the breadth of its 
targets, its scope across types of infrastructure, and the local characteristics that 
can predict its strength. 
Hometown favoritism in dictatorship has traditionally been recounted through a 
host of anecdotal examples of excessive favors that dictators bestow on their 
hometowns. Sirte, Libya, was a small unknown village until the early 1970s when 
it received massive government investments, and eventually became home of the 
Libyan parliament and most government departments after 1988 (Europa 2004). 
The town was not chosen at random: it was the birthplace of Colonel Muammar 
Gaddafi, Libya’s autocrat for 42 years. In a similar spirit, Côte d’Ivoire’s 
president Félix Houphouët-Boigny established his tiny birth town of 
Yamoussoukro as the capital, and showered it with record-breaking behemoth 
infrastructures (The Economist June 16
th
 2012); Zaire’s notorious dictator Mobutu
Sese Seko created a “jungle paradise” in his remote ancestral hometown 
Gbadolite (The Guardian February 10
th
 2015); and Sri Lankan prime minister
Mahinda Rajapaksa flooded his tiny rural birth-district Hambantota with 
extravagant projects (Los Angeles Times March 30
th
 2015), to name but a few.
Guided by those examples, recent studies have shown evidence of country 
leaders’ favoritism towards their birth regions (Hodler and Raschky 2014, Dreher 
et al. 2015) and ethnic groups (Burgess et al. 2015, Kramon and Posner 2012, 
Franck and Rainer 2012, De Luca et al. 2015). 
In contrast, little empirical evidence is known concerning favoritism beneath 
dictators, mainly due to three major obstacles. First, systematic administrative 
data on ranking officials in authoritarian societies, especially related to their 
potential targets of favoritism, are often too sensitive to obtain or collect. Second, 
when the target group is sufficiently large and could be envisaged to provide 
3 
significant political support, such as in the case of favoritism towards a major 
ethnic group, there is naturally a possible reverse causation channel from favors to 
officials’ promotions, which adds to the difficulties of interpreting regression 
coefficients. Third, even when data are available and identification is credible, 
grand scale favoritism by an all-powerful dictator towards a large group, such as 
in Burgess et al.’s (2015) investigations of Kenya’s autocratic presidents Jomo 
Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, may overwhelm or crowd out “petty favoritism” 
by most officials in the system (Burgess et al. did not find ethnic favoritism 
among key ministers in the corresponding cabinets). 
To address these challenges, we choose to study hometown favoritism in 
Vietnam. The country is ruled by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV),
3
 one
of the oldest authoritarian parties in continual existence today, with long-
established political principles and organization rules.
4
 Unlike in China, since
1984 the CPV has avoided concentration of authority in an all-powerful dictator 
by balancing power across four top positions. This division of power naturally 
constrains excessive favoritism by a single leader. The spectrum of positions in all 
political, executive and legislative bodies are selected, controlled and appointed 
by the CPV’s procedures. State officials are only accountable to the selectorate 
within the Party, but insulated from the ordinary voters (Malesky and Schuler 
2009). Under these rules, it is common knowledge that there is no need to please 
the populace in exchange of political support. To further minimize the potential 
political support that could be traded for favor, we focus on the lowest-level 
administrative unit, the commune, and consider only rural home communes. Each 
of the 9,043 rural communes in Vietnam contains at most a few thousand 
3
 The unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s constitution since 1980 designates the CPV as the unique ruling party. 
Before 1976, the CPV was called the Labour Party of Vietnam, and held power in Vietnam Democratic Republic (North 
Vietnam) since 1954. 
4
 According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2011), over the period from 
2000 to 2010, Vietnam consistently scores around the 8th percentile on voice and accountability, and around the median on 
political stability. 
4 
households, hardly meaningful to harness any political or popular support for a 
native ranking official in provincial or central government. 
The home commune of patrilineal ancestry plays a significant role in 
Vietnamese identity, representing a geographical patrilineal root that might date 
back hundreds of years in genealogical registries. People from the same 
hometown consider each other socially close even if they can be genealogically 
up to four or five generations remote,
5
 so the home commune can wield an
important influence on a native official’s social preferences. When a hometown’s 
native ascends to power, he is commonly expected to channel some favors back to 
the hometown, as captured in the old saying “one person becomes a mandarin, his 
whole clan benefits.” Hence, in the Vietnamese context, a ranking official’s 
favors towards his hometown are rather motivated by social preferences than by 
strategic political calculations. 
We examine the outcome of favoritism in terms of public infrastructure in 
communes, given its key role in development.
6
 The United Nations regards
infrastructure as one of the most important foundations for achieving its 
Millennium Development Goals. Shioji (2001) suggests that a 10% increase in 
infrastructure investment improves regional income by 1 to 1.5% in the long run. 
Fast-growing Vietnam and China invest nearly 10% of their national incomes in 
this critical foundation (Sahoo, Dash, and Nataraj 2012).
7
We collect data on all officials in ranking office during the period 2000-2010. 
Ranking officials include all members of the Party Central Committee, all 
government positions of the deputy minister rank and above, all provincial leaders 
5
 One could relate social preferences among relatives from the same hometown to co-ethnic preferences in ethnically 
fractionalized societies, but for a very small “group”. In Vietnam, ethnic favoritism is not a major factor, since a single 
ethnic group (native Vietnamese, called Kinh) constitutes 86% of the population and control most important political 
positions. 
6
 The paper is also closely related to the literature on politicians’ favoritism towards firms, in autocracies as well as 
democracies (e.g. Fisman 2001, Khwaja and Mian 2005, Do et al. 2014, among many others). 
7
 Interestingly, Persson and Zhuravskaya (2015) reports that Chinese provincial leaders who build their careers within 
the province tend to spend less on infrastructure and more on education and health, which reflects local preferences. 
5 
and all members of the legislative National Assembly. We select hometowns in 
rural areas and match them to infrastructure data on rural communes, as surveyed 
by the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS). Using OLS 
regressions with commune fixed effects and year dummies, we estimate the effect 
of new promotions of native officials on home communes’ new infrastructure. We 
further estimate the new promotion effect on the incidence rate of new 
infrastructure in a Poisson count model and a Cox survival model. 
We find strong, robust evidence of favors addressed to officials’ hometowns: 
home communes receive an average of 0.23 new categories of infrastructures 
within 3 years after a native official’s promotion (the estimated multiplicative 
effects on incidence rates are also around 1.22). Favors are narrowly targeted 
towards home communes, while similar communes in the same home district 
receive no additional infrastructures. Favoritism is widespread among middle-
ranking positions, especially in the executive branch. It is insignificant among 
representatives in the legislative National Assembly, in contrast with common 
findings in democracies’ distributive politics (Golden and Min, 2013). This 
pattern reveals the power structure within an authoritarian regime, a topic often 
considered a black box to outsiders. 
Those results shed light on the non-political nature of hometown favoritism 
motives. Political motives may take different forms. Pork-barrel politics in 
democracies is generally based on quid pro quo rewards to political 
constituencies. In some specific cases, it can be motivated by politicians’ career 
concern in their hometown (Carozzi and Repetto, 2014). In autocracies, dictators’ 
favoritism is tightly linked with political motives to strengthen political support 
and reduce the threat of rebellion (as examined by Padró-i-Miquel, 2007), and to 
build a loyal stronghold when armed conflicts take place, as witnessed in the case 
of Colonel Gaddafi’s last defense in Sirte (The Economist June 29th 2013). The
evidence of widespread favoritism narrowly targeted towards small home 
6 
communes refutes those explanations, and points to social preferences as the 
likely motive behind hometown favoritism. This explanation is further 
strengthened by an additional finding that hometown favoritism is stronger among 
areas with stronger family values (measured by remittances and worship 
expenditure in VHLSS).
8
 Narrowly-targeted favoritism under strong family
values resonates with recent studies of family culture, quality of institutions, and 
corruption (e.g. Lipset and Lenz 2000, Alesina and Giuliano 2011), which follow 
Edward Banfield’s (1958) pioneer work on how “amoral familism” (the social 
equilibrium in which people exclusively care about and trust their families) 
prevents the development of well-functioning political institutions and fosters 
deviance from norms of merit.
9
That the officials in the sample have no direct authority over commune 
budgets
10
 suggests that favoritism must be engineered through favor trading with
budget authorities, a well-known mechanism in Vietnamese politics. Typically, a 
home commune leader initiates the process by suggesting to the native official 
certain infrastructure projects that could benefit the commune. Even without 
direct budget authority, the official can use his political capital to influence 
province and district authorities in favor of his hometown’s projects. We find 
support for this mechanism in that favoritism is stronger under weaker local 
governance (measured via the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Indices). 
These findings suggest that favoritism works through informal channels based on 
specific forms of political power and institutional settings. 
8
 While we cannot reject all possibilities of officials’ personal economic gains via favoritism, some can be ruled out. 
Ranking officials live in urban areas and cannot benefit directly from hometown infrastructure. We also find stronger 
favoritism among poorer communes, but no effect on the hometown commune’s average income or population, suggesting 
that the effect is not motivated by officials’ plans to resettle in their hometown after retirement from public office. Among 
ranking officials, retirement in one’s rural hometown is considered very unlikely. 
9
 The role of links to hometown and the extended family also relates this paper to the broad literature on networks of 
relatives and compatriots, which have been shown to help with risk sharing (e.g. Angelucci, De Giorgi, and Rasul 2015; 
see review by Fafchamps 2011), job search and job referral (review by Ioannides and Loury 2004, Topa 2011). 
10
 A chairman of a Provincial People’s Committee does hold authority over district budgets within the province. 
However, we do not find significant effects on home district infrastructures. 
7 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections II to V present the political 
background of Vietnam, data description, testable hypotheses, methodology and 
empirical results, respectively. Section VI discusses the results and concludes. 
II. Context of the Study
A. Political background 
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam states that, “the 
Communist Party of Vietnam […] is the leading force of the State and the 
Society.” In practice, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has held a 
monopoly of power since Vietnam’s reunification in 1976. CPV members account 
for less than 4% of the population. In the Vietnamese political structure, the three 
most important bodies (in descending order of power) are the CPV, the 
Government, and the National Assembly. The CPV is headed by a General 
Secretary, and its leadership includes a 15-member Politburo and a 150-member 
Central Committee. These are the most powerful people in Vietnam, in charge of 
making all key personnel and strategic decisions for the country. 
The Government, headed by a Prime Minister and several Deputy Prime 
Ministers, is the executive branch of the state. Functionally, the Government 
consists of more than 30 ministries and ministry-level agencies. The cabinet also 
includes the State Bank’s Governor, the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s 
Court and the Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procuracy.11
Geographically, the Government includes 64 provincial authorities (Provincial 
People’s Committees). There are three levels of the local authorities: provincial, 
district and commune. The lower-level People’s Committees report to the 
People’s Committees immediately above them. 
11
 The judiciary branch thus has limited power, and judiciary decisions depend heavily on the Government and CPV. 
8 
The National Assembly (NA) is the legislative branch of the state. It consists of 
roughly 500 delegates elected from electoral districts based in the 64 provinces. 
All laws and budget decisions are prepared by the Government before they are 
sent to the NA for discussion and ratification. In practice, the CPV controls all 
key positions in the NA, and directs the NA to rubberstamp proposed laws. The 
CPV also closely controls the nomination and election process for the NA (as 
documented by Malesky and Schuler 2009). About 80% of the delegates are 
members of the CPV. Although the NA’s de facto power has increased in recent 
years, it is still very limited compared to that of the CPV and the Government. 
Similar to other authoritarian regimes, the ruling party selects, appoints, and 
influences the filling of all executive and legislative positions. The nominal 
process works as follows. In an election year, based on lists of nominations by the 
incumbent Politburo and Central Committee, the CPV’s Congress meets and 
selects the Central Committee, which then selects the Politburo and ranking 
positions. The CPV then nominates candidates for the NA, including its key 
positions, and citizens vote among those candidates. Afterwards, elected delegates 
of the NA, 80% of whom are CPV members, vote to approve the Prime Minister 
and cabinet members nominated by the CPV in a single, uncontested list. Finally, 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet Members appoint all other positions in the 
Government. The CPV controls closely the selection of candidates, the 
communication between candidates and constituents, the election locations and 
procedure, and the counting of the votes. Thus, the CPV’s Central Committee 
effectively decides who fill ranking positions in the Government and in the NA. 
In this system, the popular votes count little, and small entities like communes 
hold no political power over ranking officials. 
Under Vietnam’s single-party rule, there is little separation between the State 
and the CPV, and thus little distinction between bureaucrats and politicians. In 
practice, even very low-ranking officials (such as the heads of communes) need to 
9 
be members of the CPV in order to hold office and get promotions. Ranking 
members of the CPV and elected delegates of the NA receive their salaries from 
the same system and source as do government bureaucrats. 
It is useful to understand the ways in which Vietnamese state officials may 
direct public investments in infrastructure toward their preferred communes. 
Subject to the level of funding required, the decision to build public infrastructure 
is made in different stages by provincial, district and then commune officials. 
District officials have the authority to direct projects to communes. In contrast, 
officials at the central level (CPV’s Central Committee members, ranking 
members of the Central Government, or the NA) do not have the formal, 
hierarchical authority to make decisions on local infrastructure. They must 
exercise their personal influence over district officials in order to obtain 
government projects for their preferred communes. 
During the study period, Vietnam experienced significant economic growth and 
a drastic reduction in poverty. Real GDP increased by 6.5% per year on average 
from 2001 to 2010. The percentage of people living on less than two dollars (PPP) 
per day fell from 68.7% in 2002 to 38.5% in 2008 (from the World Bank’s World 
DataBank). The government’s budget, while always in deficit, was strongly 
supported by the growing economy, strong exports, and development aids. 
Consequently, the government expanded all forms of infrastructure construction, 
including in particular those in communes and districts, an attempt widely seen as 
instrumental for poverty alleviation. This period therefore holds particular interest 
for studying of a determinant of infrastructure in rural Vietnam. 
B. Hometowns in Vietnam 
In Vietnam, a person’s hometown refers to the origin commune of a person’s 
extended patrilineal family, composed of those who share one’s patrilineal 
ancestors. It is legally defined and figures prominently on every adult’s national 
10 
identity card (on which there is no information on place of birth). Urban families 
commonly make sizeable transfers and loans towards extended patrilineal family 
in their rural hometown (they amount to 25% of household income, based on 
VHLSS). Patrilineal clans also raise funds for their own activities, usually in the 
form of ancestral temples and religious ceremonies in the hometown that glorify 
common patrilineal ancestors (Nguyen and Healy 2006, Hunt 2002). Variation in 
the strength of local social norms about patrilineal family link is a determinant of 
such contribution. Those norms take root in Vietnam’s Confucian tradition, which 
is highlighted in the popular saying “one mandarin benefits the whole clan”: when 
an offspring of a clan attains a prestigious position at the royal court, the whole 
clan draws benefits, usually in terms of favors thanks to his power.  
The Vietnamese context offers the opportunity to empirically study officials’ 
favoritism towards their hometowns in the form of new infrastructures. It is 
unlikely motivated by politics, since hometowns are of negligible political 
importance. Moreover, because of Vietnam’s long wars, most ranking officials 
were either born far away from their hometown, or have moved away at a young 
age as part of waves of war refugee migrants. At the time of survey, they and their 
immediate family all live in large cities away from their rural hometowns. 
Therefore, an official’s link with his hometown is only maintained through his 
extended patrilineal family. We will examine if this link produces substantially 
more infrastructure in an official’s hometown. 
III. The Data
A. Data collection 
As in most authoritarian countries, data on officials and their family 
backgrounds in Vietnam are scarce. Available information is scattered and 
skewed toward top officials, whereas we are concerned with the full population of 
ranking officials. To avoid potential selection issues, our data collection team 
11 
identified, checked, and matched officials from three sources: the CPV’s 
information on all members of its Politburo and Central Committee, the National 
Assembly’s information on all of its members, and the Government’s information 
on central officials starting from the rank of deputy minister, and provincial 
officials starting from the rank of vice chair of provincial People’s Committees.13
The dataset thus covers exhaustively all ranking political promotions in the 
country from 2000 to 2011. Since important officials typically hold more than one 
positions in these organizations, we make sure to match all individuals across the 
three groups, if necessary by obtaining and verifying additional information from 
other sources. 
We gather information on each official’s declared hometown, understood as the 
commune of patrilineal origin in the Vietnamese legal context. This legally 
defined information appears on important individual documents, such as identity 
cards (thus fraud is unheard of). It needs not correspond to one’s birthplace. In the 
very few cases in which the declared home commune no longer exists, we trace 
the historical names of all communes in the same province for the declared name, 
and assign a modern commune that best corresponds to the old name. Officials 
whose hometowns cannot be traced to the commune level are excluded. 
Official data on commune budget are unavailable. Fortunately, data on local 
infrastructures and public goods can be obtained from the Vietnam Household 
Living Standard Survey (VHLSS, a World Bank-led survey project in Vietnam, 
part of the Living Standards Measurement Surveys). The survey receives 
technical support from the World Bank, and is regarded as the most reliable data 
on living standards in the country. The VHLSS is conducted every two years 
(2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010) from a random, representative sample of 
about 2,200 communes out of about 11,000 communes and wards in the country. 
13
 The dataset was collected from 2009 to 2011, and updated in 2014. Data sources are detailed in the appendix. 
12 
Commune characteristics used in our analysis include reported measures of 
population, geographical zone, rural classification, and the presence of various 
types of infrastructure in the commune. Measures of average income and 
expenditure per household are computed from household survey data. 
We match each official to his commune of patrilineal origin. Only rural 
communes are considered, so as to avoid the complexity of urban infrastructure 
development and association with officials.
14
 We further exclude the top four
positions in the country, namely the General Secretary of the CPV, the Prime 
Minister, the President, and the Chairman of the National Assembly, in order to 
focus on the pervasiveness of favoritism beneath the very top. 
This procedure results in a sample of 603 officials out of 1,720 officials in the 
collected three sources, matched with 503 connected rural communes. These 603 
officials hold a total of 950 position by terms, consisting of 17% in the CPV’s 
Central Committee, 16% in the central government, 23% in the provincial 
government, and 45% in the National Assembly. Apart from the three dropped 
major cities, all 60 Vietnamese provinces are covered in this sample. 
From these matches, we construct our baseline sample, in which each 
observation is a commune in a year for which this commune figures in VHLSS 
(2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, or 2010). We only include rural communes that are 
connected to at least one official in this period (henceforth referred to as 
connected communes) in our baseline sample, which covers 503 unique 
communes in 1,563 commune by year observations over 2002-2010 (350 unique 
communes in 1,281 commune by year observations until 2008). 
14
 We exclude wards, the urban equivalence of rural communes, for several reasons. First, the construction and 
management of urban infrastructures are very different from those in rural communes (e.g. urban schools are built and run 
by district or city offices), and in practice most wards already have all considered categories of infrastructure. Second, by 
excluding wards, we rule out the direct economic motive of officials who still live in their hometowns (all officials live in 
urban areas). Third, urban wards in big cities, especially the capital, could be important to the state’s security concerns (e.g. 
Campante et al 2015), thus a confounding political motive of favoritism. Fourth, family lineages in wards are usually much 
diluted by huge waves of migration, reducing the relevance of social preferences in our context. Fifth, since the VHLSS 
oversamples rural areas, we can only match 39 officials’ urban home wards with the VHLSS, compared with 503 
connected rural home communes. 
13 
B. Data and variable description 
Table 1 summarizes data patterns. Panel A describes officials in the matched 
sample as well as the full collected dataset of officials. Given that the VHLSS 
covers only a random sample of all communes in Vietnam, we can match roughly 
one third of collected officials to communes surveyed in the VHLSS. This 
proportion is around 45% for the CPV’s Central Committee, 25% for central and 
provincial governments, and 45% for the National Assembly. 
Panel B summarizes our key variables at commune by year level. The average 
rural commune in Vietnam is small, with population under 10,000, or around 
0.01% of the total population, and VND 15,000,000 (~USD 750) in income per 
capita over our study period. In comparison, our baseline sample of connected 
communes has slightly higher population and average income. Given potential 
concern of selection bias in the group of connected communes, our empirical 
strategy remains conservative insofar as it only focuses on connected communes 
and aims to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. 
Our key outcome variable 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡, commune infrastructures within 3 
years, is the total number of all infrastructure categories ever present in commune 
c in survey years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 2 (i.e. two consecutive waves of the VHLSS).15 Since
infrastructure construction lag may vary across infrastructure categories, this 
measure helps capture the full extent of native official promotions’ impact. We 
also use commune infrastructure within 1 year in our robustness checks. 
The 12 infrastructure types included in our measure can be classified into three 
groups: productive infrastructures (electricity, clean water supply in wet and dry 
seasons, irrigation system, marketplace), cultural infrastructures (post office, radio 
15
 For example, if commune c has a total of 5 types of infrastructures that are observed either in 2004 or 2006: 
marketplace, pre-school, irrigation system, clean water, and radio station, then the value of 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐,2004  is 5. By 
construction, this measure is available until 2008. 
14 
station, cultural center), and education and health infrastructures (pre-, middle-, 
and high-schools, hospital). Together, they cover all infrastructures surveyed in 
VHLSS, except for primary school and clinic, which are always present in all 
baseline communes throughout this period and therefore excluded. As shown in 
Panel B of Table 1, connected communes in our baseline sample not only have 
more infrastructures on average than those in the full surveyed rural sample at the 
beginning of our study period, but also get more infrastructures over the 
subsequent decade. 
 Our key explanatory variable 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1, commune power capital, 
adds up all ranking positions ever held by native officials until year 𝑡 − 1.16
Compared with a measure of only currently held positions by native officials 
(used in a robustness check), this accumulated measure is likely more accurate in 
reflecting the extent of a commune’s political connections in the context of 
Vietnam. In some specifications, we further decompose this power capital 
variable into power capital coming from different branches of the state, by adding 
up only corresponding positions. Average commune’s power capital experiences 
strong increases in 2004 (driven by the 2002 9
th
 Central Committee, 2004 Central
Government, and 2003 11
th 
National Assembly) and in 2010 (driven by the 2009
Central and Provincial Governments and 2008 12
th
 National Assembly). Since our
key outcome variable 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 is only available up to 2008, the baseline 
estimate does not make use of the promotions observed in 2010. 
16
 For example, 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 for a commune in 2003 is the accumulated number of ranking positions with term start 
date until 2003 held by that commune’s native officials. In our context, these include positions in the 9th CPV’s Central 
Committee (term started in 2002), 2000 and 2004 Central Governments (terms started in 1998 and 2003 respectively), 
2000 Provincial Government (term started in 2000), and 11th National Assembly (term started in 2003). 
15 
IV. Testable Hypotheses and Empirical Design
A. Testable predictions 
Given the Vietnamese political context, where most ranking officials are not 
personally involved in district-level budget decisions, favors must be brokered 
between each official and the local budget allocator. The official is endowed with 
great political capital thanks to his high rank, and cares about the welfare of his 
hometown. The budget allocator wants political help from the ranking official, in 
return for infrastructure investment in the official’s hometown. 
We will spell out three key testable hypotheses, derived from a formal model 
available in the online appendix. Under the negotiated deal, the official could 
influence infrastructures in his hometown. Given little accountability and checks 
on officials, we first predict testable Hypothesis I: hometown favoritism is 
widespread among officials. 
Second, since the negotiation outcome depends on the official’s power and the 
ease to work out a deal with the budget allocator in allocating infrastructure 
projects, we should find evidence supporting Hypothesis II: hometown 
favoritism depends positively on the official’s rank in the authoritarian hierarchy 
and on the home province’s local governance quality. 
Third, favoritism should be most present when most valued by the official. If it 
is primarily motivated by a native official’s narrowly targeted preferences towards 
his hometown, we expect evidence consistent with Hypothesis III that favoritism 
fades out as we move away from the home commune to neighboring non-
connected communes or to the home district.
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 Furthermore, it is stronger when
local culture puts more value on family ties and support. However, if instead the 
17
 Those are most naturally social preferences towards the hometown and the remote relatives living there, including 
symbolic preferences of pride in hometown’s new infrastructures. We cannot completely rule out the scenario in which 
hometown relatives serve as intermediaries to funnel benefits directly to the official, although we find it unlikely, given the 
high level of ranking officials considered in our sample. 
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motive is mostly potential political support, as commonly observed in the relevant 
literature but much unrealistic in the authoritarian context of Vietnam, the 
evidence should reject Hypothesis III. 
B. Empirical Design 
We first investigate the effect of connected officials on hometown 
infrastructures in a benchmark linear framework, where the total of infrastructure 
categories available in a commune within three years is regressed on a measure of 
the commune’s power capital, derived from all ranking officials native to the 
commune. The sample is an unbalanced panel of all rural matched communes, 
and each observation represents a commune in a specific year: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡. (1)
The indices c and t represent home commune c in survey year t 
(𝑡 ∈ {2002, 2004, 2006, 2008}). As described in section III.B, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 is 
the total number of all infrastructure categories ever available in commune c in 
survey years 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 2, and 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 counts all ranking positions 
ever held by each official until year 𝑡 − 1. 𝛿𝑡 and 𝜇𝑐 denote respectively year and 
commune fixed effects. The vector 𝑿𝑐𝑡 regroups time-variant observable controls 
including population size, average income, and dummies for five different 
geographical zones. 
The key parameter 𝛽 is interpretable as the effect of power capital on the 
number of available hometown infrastructure categories within three years: 
∂𝐄(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡|𝑿𝑐𝑡)
𝜕𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1
= 𝛽. In the presence of commune fixed effects 𝜇𝑐, 𝛽 is 
identified from changes in 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 and 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1, that is, from 
new promotions of officials from the same commune. Given the lack of data on 
the size and quality of each infrastructure category, we could only identify 
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favoritism’s impact on new types of infrastructures, not on the improvement of 
existing types. 
In support of a causal interpretation of 𝛽, the specification first relies on 
commune fixed effects 𝜇𝑐 to deal with commune time-invariant omitted 
unobservable factors that may bias the estimates. For example, a province’s 
wealth and power, or geographical conditions such as distances to large cities and 
major rivers, may correlate with better infrastructure and also the capacity to 
produce more high-ranked officials. Year fixed effects 𝛿𝑡 allay concerns about 
macroeconomic shifts that could affect both new promotions and infrastructure 
construction. To make correct inferences when the error term 𝜀𝑐𝑡 may be serially 
correlated, we cluster standard errors by commune. 
Regarding time-variant factors that may influence both promotions and 
infrastructures, such as good local economic performances, we note that officials 
in our sample are not directly responsible for the performances of home 
communes, as explained in section II. Given their high ranks, their preceding 
positions must have already been much above the commune level since decades. 
Therefore, if such time-variant factors are driving the results, we must be able to 
detect similar effects in neighboring communes in the same province. We thus 
perform placebo tests of our causal interpretation on neighboring communes 
matched with connected communes. 
The variable 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 accumulates all ranking positions ever held by 
officials from commune c up to year t-1, so the change in 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 
counts new promotions of officials from commune c, and ignores eventual 
departure from previous offices. It represents a social capital concept that captures 
an official’s influence in his previous office even after a move or promotion, or 
even retirement. In the context of Vietnam, the accumulated measure of capital is 
likely more accurate in reflecting the extent of a commune’s political connections 
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than the current power level of native officials (also used in a robustness check). 
In one recent case, for instance, a former Minister of Education relinquished that 
position to become Deputy Prime Minister; however, he still exerts particularly 
strong influence on the Ministry of Education. 
Equation (1) accounts for the timing of infrastructure construction in a simple 
way, in which all new infrastructures that appear in the following three years (two 
survey waves) are counted together. We choose this benchmark specification for 
the simplicity and transparency of its interpretation. In robustness checks, we use 
two other models with structural constraints on the timing of new infrastructures: 
a Poisson count model and a Cox proportional hazard model. 
First, the number of new infrastructure categories in each commune can be 
modeled by a Poisson process with incidence rate 𝜆𝑐𝑡 over a survey interval of T 
= 2 years following year t (during which a new infrastructure “arrives” 
independently at this rate): 
𝜆𝑐𝑡𝑇 = exp(𝛽∆𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑃). (2)
The likelihood function for the number of new infrastructure categories in the 
following T years is given by Pr(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝑦) = 𝑒
−(𝜆𝑐𝑡𝑇)(𝜆𝑐𝑡𝑇)
𝑦 𝑦!⁄ ,
which yields MLE estimates of the parameters (𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿𝑡). The coefficient 𝛽 
estimates the effect of new promotions on the log incidence rate of new 
infrastructure categories (so the effect on the incidence-rate ratio of an increase of 
power capital is exp (𝛽)). Because 𝐄(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡|𝑿𝑐𝑡) = 𝜆𝑐𝑡𝑇, so 𝛽 =
∂log𝐄(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡|𝑿𝑐𝑡)
𝜕∆𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑡
, therefore 𝛽 is also interpreted as the effect on the 
expected log number of new infrastructures. In the same spirit as the identification 
in (1), we use changes in infrastructures and changes in power capital (new 
promotions). We further include province fixed effects 𝜇𝑃 (similar to the inclusion 
of province fixed trends in the benchmark OLS specification). The Poisson model 
belongs to a small class of nonlinear models where group fixed effects can be 
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completely separated from the maximized likelihood function (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2013, chapter 9), so there is no longer the problem of incidental 
parameters, and the fixed effects 𝜇𝑃 need not be estimated as parameters. 
Second, we can model the incident of improving infrastructures as a survival 
process, where the event of “failure” for a commune is defined as an improvement 
in the overall number of infrastructures. We use a Cox proportional hazard model, 
under the assumption that changes in covariates affect the hazard function 
multiplicatively, to write the hazard function 𝐻(𝑡) as the product of a baseline, 
unspecified hazard function 𝐻0(𝑡) and a hazard ratio:
𝐻(𝑡|𝑋) = 𝐻0(𝑡)exp(𝛽∆𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑃). (3)
The parameters (𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿𝑡) are estimated by maximum of a partial likelihood that 
needs no information on the baseline hazard function 𝐻0(𝑡). The coefficient 𝛽
estimates the effect of new promotions on the log hazard of infrastructure 
improvement (so the effect on the hazard ratio is exp (𝛽)). Similar to the Poisson 
model, we include province fixed effects 𝜇𝑃. We address the potential problem of 
incidental parameters by estimating the model as if the data were stratified at 
province level (𝐻0(𝑡) is specified as 𝐻0,𝑃(𝑡) for different provinces P’s), which
cancels out 𝜇𝑃 that we do not need to estimate (Chamberlain, 1985). 
The Poisson model uses full information in the number of new infrastructures, 
while the Cox model only uses information in a binary outcome of infrastructure 
improvement. On the other hand, the Cox model is much more flexible as the 
baseline hazard function can take any form, as opposed to a fixed constant 
incidence rate in the Poisson model.
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 Both models require fairly strong structural
assumptions on the time process of new infrastructures that are not supported in 
18
 There is a certain link between the two models: If the true hazard rate is constant, then the Cox model should 
produce similar results to the Poisson count model with only binary outcomes. Appendix Table A1 reports robust estimates 
from a conditional logit model of infrastructure improvement over fixed intervals as a function of new promotions. 
20 
the data.
19
 For the sake of simplicity and clarity, we choose the benchmark linear
regression model, which has a clear interpretation of the coefficient 𝛽, and 
imposes minimal structure on how power capital may affect infrastructures. 
V. Empirical results 
This section aims to address the questions that correspond to the hypotheses put 
forth in Section IV.A: (i) Does favoritism arise in an authoritarian regime? (ii) 
Who is powerful in the political hierarchy? (iii) What is the motive of favoritism? 
A. Does favoritism arise in an authoritarian regime? 
Table 2 presents different estimations of the impacts of an official's promotion 
to a ranking position on infrastructure development in his rural home commune, 
using the baseline sample of connected communes.  
Column (1) shows the benchmark specification that regresses 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡, 
commune infrastructures within 3 years, o𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1n , commune power 
capital, as described in section IV.B. Control variables include commune’s 
population and average income, and a full set of commune and year dummies. We 
find that an additional ranking position in the power capital of a commune 
increase its sum of infrastructure categoriess by 0.23, statistically significant at 
1%. This estimate amounts to 3% of the mean and 15% of the standard deviation 
of commune infrastructures.
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 Since the Poisson model typically encounters overdispersion in the data, we also report in Appendix Table A1 very 
similar results obtained from a negative binomial model that could better fit the observed dispersion. 
20
 We further verify the statistical inferences from this exercise with 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations of column (1)’s 
specification, in each of which every commune’s power capital is drawn randomly from the baseline sample power capital 
distribution. As expected, the distribution of the simulated estimates of the coefficient on power capital (reported in 
Appendix Figure A2) is centered around zero, while our baseline estimate of 0.227 falls on the 99.9th percentile. 
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Column (2) uses immediate infrastructures (commune infrastructures within 1 
year) as the outcome variable. The immediate effect’s magnitude is similar to 
column (1)’s benchmark estimate, but it is less precisely estimated, and only 
statistically significant at 10%.
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 Column (3) uses current power level, measured
by the number of ranking positions that the commune’s native officials currently 
hold, instead of accumulated power capital. The effect is still sizeable and 
significant, but considerably smaller than power capital’s effect found in column 
(1). This is consistent with section IV.B’s consideration of power capital as a 
social capital concept, whereby an official’s personal connections are preserved 
when he moves or get promoted to a different position. 
Figure 1 further shows the effects of new promotions over time, by 
decomposing the benchmark variable power capital. We use commune 
infrastructures within 1 year as the dependent variable (as in Table 2’s column 2). 
We include explanatory variables that count the number of new promotions of 
native officials for the years -1, 0, 1, 2 before the surveyed year 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐,𝑡−𝑠, 𝑠 ∈ {−1,0,1,2}, and the accumulated power capital of 3 
years before the surveyed year 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−3, in place of the benchmark 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1. The coefficients of those variables are reported on Figure 1. 
Not surprisingly, the impact starts at least one year after a new promotion. 
Because of the decomposition 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 = 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐,𝑡−1 +
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−3, the average of the coefficients of 
those three variables (≈ 0.237) is expectedly close to the coefficient in Table 2’s 
column (2). Besides, the variables 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐,𝑡−𝑠, 𝑠 ∈ {−1,0} serve as 
placebo tests, since we do not expect significant impacts of future or 
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 Alternatively, we apply Kling et al’s (2007) method of aggregation of commune infrastructures by using the z-score 
of each infrastructure instead of a dummy indicating its presence in the commune. The resulting estimate (standard error) is 
0.608 (0.199), approximately 15% of the baseline sample standard deviation of the outcome measure, and statistically 
significant at 1%. We prefer our aggregation without the z-scores for a more transparent interpretation of the effect, and to 
avoid inflating the role of low-variation infrastructure categories in the aggregated measure. 
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contemporaneous promotions on today’s infrastructure. Indeed, their coefficients 
are much closer to zero.
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Table 2’s following columns estimate the effect of changes in power capital on 
changes in commune infrastructures. Column (4) shows the corresponding OLS 
regression, controlling for changes in column (1)’s control variables, year 
dummies, and province fixed effects (equivalent to province-specific trends in the 
level equation). The effect of 0.19 is slightly smaller than that in column (1), and 
also statistically significant at 1%. 
Column (5) reports estimates from section IV.B’s Poisson count model of new 
infrastructures, including the same set of controls and fixed effects. The 
coefficient of changes in power capital is 0.20, statistically significant at 1%. It 
indicates that a single promotion of a native official multiplies the incidence rate 
of a new category of infrastructure over a 2-year period by exp(0.20) = 1.22. It 
means an increase of 22% of new infrastructures (see section IV.B), equivalent to 
0.18 more new infrastructures (the sample mean of new infrastructures is 0.81). 
Hence, despite the Poisson model’s strong structural restrictions, the effect does 
not substantially deviate from the benchmark effect in column (1) (even though a 
comparison between these two interpretations is not entirely rigorous). 
In column (6), we estimate section IV.B’s Cox proportional hazard model of the 
incidence of infrastructure improvement, controlling for the same set of controls 
and fixed effects. The coefficient of changes in power capital is 0.22, statistically 
significant at 5%. A single promotion of a native official is thus estimated to 
multiply the hazard rate of infrastructure improvement by exp(0.22) = 1.25. 
While the effect’s magnitude is not readily comparable with the other 
specifications’, column (6)’s finding confirms that native officials’ promotion 
23
 The estimated coefficients are not statistically significant, as precision is dampened by the inclusion of many 
explanatory variables with low predictive power. The full regression is reported in Appendix Table A1. 
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leads to new infrastructures, even when we impose the proportional hazard 
restriction and only use limited variation in the outcome (only the incidence, not 
the magnitude of improved infrastructures). 
In Table 3 we verify that Table 2’s findings are robust to various sensitivity 
checks. These checks include excluding 2002 as only 4 out of 12 infrastructures 
were surveyed in that year (column (1)),
24
 splitting the baseline sample into less
and more developed communes (columns (2) and (3)), using the full sample of all 
surveyed rural communes that also includes non-connected communes (column 
(4)), and using different fixed effects and clustering levels (columns (5) to (7)). 
The estimates are of comparable magnitude to Table 2’s findings, and highly 
statistically significant across all specifications. In addition, columns (2) and (3) 
suggest that the effect is larger among less developed communes (classified by the 
number of infrastructures observed in 2004), as they have more room for 
infrastructure development. 
Overall, Tables 2 and 3 show that a commune’s increase in power capital due to 
native officials’ promotions is strongly associated with more infrastructure 
categories in subsequent years. This finding is robust across different measures of 
infrastructures and power, and different econometric specifications. We will build 
on the benchmark specification from Table 2’s column (1) in the rest of the paper, 
as its estimate is most interpretable, and it requires minimal assumptions. 
Table 4 shows the effects of commune power capital on different types of 
infrastructures and other outcomes. Columns (1) to (3) show the effects on 
infrastructures for production (electricity, water in wet and dry seasons, market, 
and irrigation system), cultural activities (post office, radio station, and cultural 
center), and education and health (pre-, middle-, high-schools, and hospital). Each 
24
 Our baseline infrastructure measure (i.e. sum of infrastructures observed in at least one of the subsequent two 
surveys after that year in that commune) is not greatly affected by the fact that only 4 out of 12 infrastructures were 
surveyed in 2002, as all 12 infrastructures were included in 2004 survey.   
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outcome variable is constructed similarly to 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 over the group of 
relevant infrastructures. The effects on productive and cultural infrastructures are 
large and statistically significant, as both estimates amount to 4% of the baseline 
sample mean and 12% of the baseline standard deviation of the respective 
infrastructure variables. The effect on education and health infrastructures is 
limited in both magnitude and statistical significance.
25
 High maintenance cost,
especially in terms of teachers or health workers, may explain the low effect, even 
though we cannot rule out an explanation by local preferences. 
Columns (4) to (6) show the effects of power capital on log commune average 
income and expenditure per capita, and log population in the subsequent survey 
year. All three estimates are small in magnitude and not statistically significant, 
suggesting that native official promotion does not have direct effects on home 
commune’s economic outcomes within the relatively short 3-year window. It is 
thus unlikely that new infrastructure results from a stronger local economy.
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The results presented in Tables 2 to 4 are consistent with the claim of 
widespread favoritism among Vietnamese officials, shown in the form of newly 
bestowed infrastructure projects in their home communes. Given that our sample 
does not include top leaders, this finding provides support for Hypothesis I, which 
states that non-top officials in authoritarian regimes also exercise favoritism.  
A common alternative explanation found in most studies of favoritism and 
pork-barrel politics (e.g. Kramon and Posner 2012) is that a native official has 
better information on his home commune and helps budget allocators direct more 
resources to that commune to improve efficiency. In our context, this explanation 
is inconsistent with several details. First, better information should have been 
25
 The estimated effect on education and health infrastructures amounts to only 0.7% of the baseline sample mean and 
3% of the baseline standard deviation of the respective infrastructure variable. 
26
 This is not enough to ascertain that promoted native officials do not care about the local economy, because it may 
take time for the newly constructed infrastructures to produce an effect. 
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shared even before the promotion, since all studied officials (especially in the 
Government and the CPV) had already held notable positions that allowed for 
convenient communication with district budget allocators. Second, by the time of 
promotion, most officials had long since left their rural hometowns, so their 
information on hometowns is unlikely to be new to budget allocators in district 
authorities. Third, the included infrastructures are considered necessary in every 
commune in the state’s long-run development plans, so further knowledge of local 
conditions is unlikely to affect the decision to undertake such constructions. 
Fourth, even if an official had better information on which infrastructure a 
commune needs most, it would only result in shifting between different types of 
infrastructure, and would not produce the positive effect on the measured total 
number of infrastructure categories. 
B. Who has the power to give favors? 
Next we investigate the pervasiveness and degree of favoritism across different 
groups of Vietnamese officials, including members of the National Assembly 
(NA), Central and Provincial Governments, and the CPV’s Central Committee. 
While the literature on favoritism in autocratic regimes has mostly addressed top 
leaders with both political interest and power to favor certain groups (e.g. Burgess 
et al 2015), our sample also covers a large number of mid-level officials. This 
investigation helps shed light on the power structure of different groups of 
Vietnamese political elites. 
Table 5’s Panel A compares the effect of power capital in different groups of 
officials. In democracies, the politics of earmarking and pork barrel concentrates 
in the hands of lawmakers (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981, Bickers and 
Stein 2000). In contrast, in authoritarian Vietnam, estimates in columns (1) and 
(2) indicate that an NA position has very little power compared to other positions. 
The point estimate of NA power capital’s effect is not statistically different from 
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zero, and is only one third of that of non-NA power capital. The difference 
between the two estimates is statistically significant at 5%. This finding is 
consistent with the observation that a regular member of the NA without another 
ranking position in the executive branch or CPV can hardly use his parliamentary 
membership as leverage for any real benefits, as the CPV and Central 
Government make major decisions (Malesky, Schuler and Tran 2012). 
If the NA has very little power to allocate the budget, then which branch does? 
Columns (3) and (4) compare the effect of power capital from the executive 
branch (including Central and Provincial Governments) to other branches. A 
promotion in the executive branch brings 0.47 additional infrastructure categories 
to the home commune (statistically significant at 1%), almost five times the effect 
of a promotion to non-executive branches. The strong effect of power capital from 
executive branch positions highlights the considerable political power of Central 
Government members to affect public decisions beyond their jurisdiction. That 
would be consistent with an informal channel of influence through exchanges of 
personal favors (between ranking officials and local budget allocators). A simple 
model of this informal channel is discussed in the appendix. 
Column (5) examines the effect of a promotion to a middle-ranking position in 
the executive branch or CPV, which include all positions in our sample below the 
rank of minister or equivalent (data construction is detailed in the appendix). A 
promotion to a middle-ranking position brings 0.35 new infrastructure categories 
to the home commune. The effect is statistically significant at 1%, and 
significantly greater than that of ordinary non-chaired positions in the NA 
(column (6)). Favoritism is thus clearly not limited to only top-level officials, as 
shown in the existing literature, but also pervasive in the midrange of Vietnamese 
politics, especially within the executive branch and the CPV. 
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An alternative way to compare the influences of different groups of political 
elites is to run “horserace” regressions, reported in Table 5’s Panel B. Column (1) 
includes in one regression three power capital variables separately for: the CPV’s 
Central Committee, the NA, and the executive branch. The result is intriguing: 
While its one-party role is anchored in the constitution, the CPV’s influence is 
much smaller than the executive branch’s, and is not significantly different from 
zero. The same pattern holds when we break infrastructures into three groups: 
productive, cultural and education and health (columns (2) to (4)). This shows that 
being a member of the high-profile CPV’s Central Committee still does not help 
one’s hometown much, unless one holds an additional executive position.  
The remaining columns in Panel B show a surprising difference in the 
influences of different ranks of Vietnamese political elites. Columns (5) to (8) 
show that only middle-ranking positions in the executive branch or CPV have 
positive and statistically significant effects on hometown infrastructures. Middle-
ranking positions in the NA have positive but insignificant effects. Most 
intriguingly, top-ranking positions have negative although statistically 
insignificant effects on hometown infrastructures. A speculative explanation of 
this pattern is that while low-level promotions (e.g. non-chaired positions in the 
NA) do not yield enough power to exercise hometown favoritism, promotions to 
top-ranking positions do not exert much effect on hometown infrastructure 
because those hometowns have already obtained sufficient infrastructures by that 
time. The fact that we only detect favoritism among middle-ranking officials does 
not rule out other potential channels top officials can favor their hometowns. 
Together, the results from Table 5 show that hometown favoritism is a 
phenomenon widespread across different groups and ranks of Vietnamese 
officials, consistent with Hypothesis I. The magnitude of favoritism varies 
substantially across different ranks and divisions within the government, 
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consistent with Hypothesis II. In particular, we find that even middle-ranking 
officials in the executive branch or CPV are more powerful than members of the 
legislative National Assembly. This pattern underlines the importance of informal 
authority and the inconsequence of legislative bodies in less democratic countries.  
C. What is the motive of hometown favoritism? 
In existing studies of political favoritism, the identification of the motive of 
favoritism represents a formidable challenge. Officials may favor friends and 
relatives because of their social preferences for their kin, or strategic calculations 
in building and profiting from a political base. For instance, pork-barrel politics 
are mostly explained in terms of quid pro quo rewards to political constituencies, 
and ethnic favoritism by dictators arguably serves to build a coalition of support 
(Padró i Miquel 2007). In our context, we assess the relative importance of these 
two motives by comparing favoritism at the commune and the district levels. 
Political versus non-political motives: As argued in section IV.A, if favoritism 
is motivated principally by social preferences towards the home commune, it 
should be narrowly targeted, and little effect should be detected outside the home 
commune. In contrast, if political support is what motivates favoritism, it should 
be reinforced at the district level. We report tests for the two motives in Table 6. 
Addressing narrow targeting, columns (1) to (6) use a sample of matched pairs 
between a connected home commune and its most similar rural non-connected 
commune in the same home district, defined by the shortest Mahalanobis distance 
based on predetermined variables.
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 In each column, an infrastructure outcome of
the matched non-connected commune is regressed on the home commune’s power 
capital, controlling for the pair fixed effects. Column (1) shows that a promotion 
31
 The Mahalanobis distance between two communes in the same district is calculated based on their geographical 
distance, their average income per capita and population in 2002, and their level of infrastructure development in 2004. 
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of a native official from one commune has a negative, statistically insignificant 
effect, on infrastructure development of similar communes in the same home 
district. The estimate remains similar even when we focus only on promotions to 
positions with the strongest effects on home commune’s infrastructures, namely 
executive branch or middle-ranking positions, as shown in columns (2) and (3). 
The estimate is close to zero for categories of cultural infrastructures (column (5)) 
and education and health infrastructures (column (6)), while for productive 
infrastructure it is slightly larger in magnitude, but still not statistically significant 
(column (4)). 
When those estimates are compared with the corresponding effects in home 
communes, the difference is always large and strongly significant. They clearly 
show that favoritism is narrowly targeted towards home communes, not similar 
communes close by. The negative effects in the matched communes may hint that 
home communes benefit from favoritism at the expense of their neighbors, an 
effect in line with a fixed total district budget. Given that all estimates are not 
significant, this interpretation is inconclusive. 
Going further, columns (7) and (8) explore potential favoritism beyond 
connected communes in a sample of connected districts.
32
 Average and total
infrastructure outcomes (computed among non-connected communes) are 
respectively regressed on the home district’s power capital (total power capital of 
all of its communes). Both estimates are close to zero and not statistically 
significant, thus not consistent with the motive of district political support. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 suggest that the observed favoritism is narrowly 
targeted to home communes. They support Hypothesis III that favoritism is driven 
by native officials' social preferences towards their home communes, and unlikely 
by political motives. 
32
 415 out of 656 districts in Vietnam are connected to at least one official in our study period. 
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Family values: We further investigate whether favoritism is associated with 
local culture’s stress on patrilineal duties and altruism towards the family. If 
officials’ favoritism is chiefly motivated by their social preferences towards their 
patrilineal origin, we expect higher levels of favoritism in areas where the local 
culture puts more emphasis on these values. We use the ratio of domestic 
remittances and worship expenditure over household income in 2002, averaged 
over surveyed households, as a proxy for family values by district.
35
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 apply the benchmark regression on subsamples 
of communes with strong and weak family values, split at the median of the 
measure. The effect of power capital on infrastructure development in communes 
with strong family values is substantially larger than the benchmark (0.36 versus 
0.23) and statistically significant at 1%, while such effect in weak family value 
communes is significantly smaller (difference significant at 5%), and not 
statistically distinguishable from zero. This evidence suggests that the findings on 
favoritism are obtained from communes with stronger norms of family duties.  
To further explore the heterogeneity of favoritism by family values, we plot our 
benchmark measure of favoritism, namely the regression coefficient of hometown 
infrastructures on promotion, as a function of family values (in percentile) in 
Figure 2’s first graph.36 The extent of favoritism appears robustly increasing in
family values, until it stabilizes among the top quartile of family values. 
Economic conditions: By focusing on rural communes, we have ruled out the 
possibility that some officials still live in their home communes and draw direct 
benefits from new infrastructure. We now explore whether favoritism helps an 
35
 Below the district level, a measure of family values by commune would take up too much noise. 
36
 As detailed in the appendix, Figure 2’s graphs are estimated semi-parametrically: the estimate at each percentile of 
the X axis variable is obtained from the benchmark regression from Table 2 weighted by a kernel function at that point. 
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official make a long-term investment, eventually for retirement back in his 
hometown, or if it acts as a transfer towards his hometown and extended family 
there.
37
 In the first case, the effect should be stronger among richer hometowns,
since a retired ranking official would unlikely leave a big city life where his 
family has been enjoying much higher living standards to a backward rural 
commune with poor basic infrastructures. In the second case, favoritism should be 
stronger for poor hometowns. 
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 7 report that the effect of power capital on 
commune infrastructures is substantially larger in poorer communes than in richer 
communes (0.27 versus 0.15, sample split at median income per capita in 2002). 
Although the difference between them is not statistically significant, only the 
estimate among poorer communes is statistically significant at 5%. The pattern is 
further confirmed in Figure 2’s second graph, which shows that favoritism is 
relatively stable among below-median-income communes, but quickly declines at 
higher levels of income per capita. The evidence suggests that favoritism likely 
acts as transfers towards a small group of population with some connections to the 
official as prescribed by local norms. 
Local governance: We now investigate how the extent of favoritism varies by 
the difficulty to implement it through informal channels within Vietnam’s 
administrative system. As discussed previously, most ranking officials do not 
have any hierarchical authorities over budget allocation by districts towards their 
home communes, so favoritism is probably brokered via exchanges of favor. 
Strong local governance may act as a barrier against this mechanism. We 
construct a measure of local governance quality based that aggregates relevant 
questions included in the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Indices 2006, a set 
37
 Even when favoritism correlates with higher family values, we cannot determine whether a promoted official acts 
out of pure altruism as prosocial preferences towards his hometown and his extended family there, or he has selfish 
symbolic preferences for gratitude, recognition, or admiration from his hometown. 
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of indices of industries’ governance perceptions that has been systematically 
constructed with the help from the UNDP since 2006 (see details in Malesky 2006 
and subsequent reports). Details of the measure’s construction are described in the 
appendix. A higher local governance quality score indicates less corrupted and 
more transparent local governance. 
Columns (5) and (6) show that favoritism towards hometown infrastructure is 
only detected in the subsample of below-median local governance. In this 
subsample, the effect is 0.34, statistically significant at 1%, while in the 
subsample of high local governance quality it is only 0.08, and not significant. 
This pattern is also visible in Figure 2’s last graph, where the favoritism effect is 
steadily decreasing in the quality of local governance. These results suggest that 
hometown favoritism is rampant under weak local governance. 
In sum, Table 6 shows that favors are narrowly targeted, and Table 7 and Figure 
2 associate hometown favoritism with stronger family values, lower income, and 
weaker governance. These patterns are consistent with the view that hometown 
favoritism is likely motivated by social and cultural preferences, rather than by 
political calculations. 
VI. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we find robust evidence of widespread hometown favoritism in 
Vietnam, as a hometowns receives on average 0.23 new infrastructure categories 
within 3 years following a native official’s promotion to high office. While 
middle-ranking officials, especially in the executive branch, widely exercise 
favoritism, non-chaired members of the legislative National Assembly do not. 
This pattern reveals the power structure within an authoritarian regime, in stark 
contrast with common findings in distributive politics in democracies (Golden and 
Min 2013). Because officials without direct authority over commune budgets can 
direct resources to their home commune, favoritism is likely engineered through 
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informal influence and favor trading with budget authorities. In support of this 
interpretation, communes in provinces with worse local governance tend to reap 
more benefits from favoritism. 
We find that officials target favors narrowly to their small home communes 
instead of distributing them over their home districts. In Vietnam, the potential 
political support of a commune’s population is negligible to an official’s career. 
The findings thus suggest that hometown favoritism is unlikely motivated by 
political aims, as commonly considered in the existing literature. Instead, we 
suggest an explanation based on officials’ social preferences towards hometowns, 
supported by the evidence of stronger hometown favoritism found in areas with 
stronger family values. It remains an open question whether social preferences or 
strategic behaviors are more important in explaining favoritism across the world. 
The important question of efficiency has been left out in this paper, as it is in 
most related studies. It is not exactly clear how favoritism affects the allocative 
efficiency of public resources. Apart from the intuitive interpretation that it could 
cause serious misallocations of public resources, one might also speculate that 
officials possess better information about their home communes and can help 
direct public resources to more efficient use there. This information channel 
presents a formidable challenge to the literature on favoritism and patronage 
politics, and remains an interesting avenue for future research. 
In our study, it is unlikely that favoritism leads to a more efficient use of 
resources. Even if promoted officials know their communes’ needs, it is unlikely 
that they have enough of an information advantage in comparison with district 
budget authorities, in order to produce more efficient allocations. Besides, were it 
to exist, their information advantage should have materialized long before the 
promotion, and should have spilled over to neighboring communes; both of which 
are not supported by our empirical results. However, we remain cautious in 
making claims about efficiency. 
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Based on standard economic theory, marginal incentives for corruption for 
personal gains should diminish as office holders become richer and their marginal 
utility smaller. It implies that in the long run, growth and stable politics should 
automatically reduce corruption rates. This paper’s results raise some doubts 
about this view. Because of their willingness to abuse power to channel public 
resources to social connections, high-ranking officials may maintain an appetite 
for corruption far beyond their own consumption. Without proper transparency on 
public officials’ relevant social connections, even fast-growing economies under 
autocracy would find it hard to combat corruption. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Ranking officials 
Term Baseline sample (officials with surveyed home communes) Whole population of ranking officials 2000-2010 
Official group/subgroup Start year End year Number of position x term’s 
Number of 
unique officials 
Number of 
communes 
Number of 
position x term’s 
Number of 
unique officials 
Number of 
communes 
Central Committee 159 17% 117 19% 112 22% 335 13% 255 15% 243 18% 
Central Committee 9th 2002 2006 60 6% 60 10% 59 12% 148 6% 148 9% 146 11% 
Central Committee 10th 2007 2011 99 10% 99 16% 94 19% 187 7% 187 11% 178 14% 
Central Government 148 16% 101 17% 96 19% 487 19% 361 21% 290 22% 
Government from 2000 yearbook 1998 2002 30 3% 30 5% 30 6% 128 5% 128 7% 102 8% 
Government from 2004 yearbook 2003 2007 61 6% 61 10% 60 12% 188 7% 188 11% 173 13% 
Government from 2009 yearbook 2008 2011 57 6% 57 9% 57 11% 171 7% 171 10% 162 12% 
Provincial Government 215 23% 140 23% 131 26% 811 31% 593 34% 488 37% 
Government from 2000 yearbook 2000 2003 51 5% 51 8% 51 10% 249 10% 249 14% 190 14% 
Government from 2004 yearbook 2004 2008 84 9% 84 14% 81 16% 265 10% 265 15% 253 19% 
Government from 2009 yearbook 2009 2012 80 8% 80 13% 77 15% 297 11% 297 17% 278 21% 
National Assembly 428 45% 376 62% 333 66% 955 37% 844 49% 755 57% 
National Assembly 11th  2003 2007 220 23% 220 36% 207 41% 499 19% 499 29% 468 36% 
National Assembly 12th  2008 2011 208 22% 208 34% 198 39% 456 18% 456 27% 438 33% 
Total 950 100% 603 100% 503 100% 2,588 100% 1,720 100% 1,318 100% 
Panel B. Communes 
Baseline sample (rural communes with native officials) Whole VHLSS rural commune population 
Commune statistics 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Overall 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Overall 
Sample coverage 
Number of communes 316 327 327 311 282 503 2,311 2,261 2,279 2,219 2,166 4,065 
Number of districts 199 208 208 198 198 272 583 573 575 582 571 656 
Number of provinces 55 59 59 57 57 63 61 64 64 64 64 64 
Commune statistics 
Average population (people) 9,779 9,665 9,644 9,706 10,217 9,789 9,271 8,625 8,643 8,830 9,024 8,878 
Average annual income per capita ('000 VND) 4,849 5,216 6,871 10,294 15,099 8,301 4,102 5,190 6,888 10,575 14,846 8,272 
% of communes with poverty classification 12.97 13.50 14.07 12.54 10.28 12.74 18.95 20.98 19.45 18.03 20.64 19.6 
Average commune infrastructures (over 12 categories) 
within 3 years 6.74 7.35 7.48 7.51 - 7.28 6.54 7.11 7.23 7.20 - 7.03 
only productive infrastructures 2.58 2.89 2.93 3.06 - 2.87 2.46 2.72 2.75 2.80 - 2.69 
only cultural infrastructures 1.99 2.24 2.33 2.28 - 2.22 1.94 2.21 2.27 2.22 - 2.17 
only education & health infrastructures 2.17 2.21 2.21 2.17 - 2.19 2.14 2.18 2.20 2.18 - 2.17 
within 1 year - 6.60 6.89 6.97 8.01 7.09 - 6.37 6.60 6.76 7.52 6.80 
Average commune power capital until the year before 0.18 0.82 1.02 1.24 1.89 1.01 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.16 
from Central Committee positions 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.28 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 
from Central Government positions 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
from Provincial Government positions 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.31 0.43 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 
from National Assembly positions 0.00 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.89 0.40 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.06 
Note: Commune infrastructures within 3 years is the total number of all infrastructure categories present in that commune in that year’s survey or the following survey. Productive infrastructures 
include electricity, clean water supply in dry season, clean water supply in wet season, irrigation system, and marketplace (5 categories). Cultural infrastructures include post office, radio station, and 
cultural center (3 categories). Education and health infrastructures include pre-school, middle school, high school, and hospital (4 categories). Commune infrastructures within 1 year is the sum of 
infrastructures observed in that commune in the first subsequent survey on or after that year. Commune power capital adds up all ranking positions ever held by native officials until the year before. 
Table 2. Main results: Increased commune's power capital improves infrastructures 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Specification OLS in level equation 
OLS in 
difference 
equation 
Poisson model Cox model 
Dependent variable 
Total 
infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Total 
infrastructures 
within 1 year 
Total 
infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Change in total 
infrastructures 
Total new 
infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Infrastructure 
improvement 
Power capital 0.227 0.224 
[0.0746]*** [0.126]* 
Current power level 0.137 
[0.0796]* 
Change in power capital 0.187 0.200 0.224 
[0.0667]*** [0.0641]*** [0.102]** 
Effect on incidence rate 1.22 1.25 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Province & Year Province & Year Province & Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune 
Observations 1,237 941 1,237 898 730 326 
R-squared 0.760 0.756 0.757 0.136 
Note: This table relates native officials’ promotion to a home commune’s new infrastructure. Each observation is a connected commune in a 
year (2002, 2004, 2006, or 2008 for columns (1) to (3) and 2004, 2006, or 2008 for columns (4) to (6)). Controls include commune’s log 
average income per capita, log population, and geographical zone. Columns (1) to (3) report OLS regressions in level, including commune and 
year fixed effects. Infrastructure outcomes are measured within 3 years for column (1) and (3), and 1 year for column (2). Columns (1) and (2) 
use total positions accumulated by native officials (i.e. power capital), and column (3) uses the number of current positions held by native 
officials. Columns (4) to (6) relate different changes in infrastructure outcomes to changes in power capital, controlling for changes in 
commune controls, and province and year fixed effects. Column (4) reports an OLS specification, column (5) shows a Poisson model of new 
infrastructure within 1 year, and column (6) reports a Cox proportional hazard model of the incidence of infrastructure improvement. The 
multiplicative effects on incidence rate in columns (5) and (6) are exponentials of the corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors in 
brackets are clustered at commune level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table 4. Effects of increased power capital on different outcomes 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable 
Productive 
infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Cultural 
infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Education & health 
infrastructures   
within 3 years 
Log average 
income 
within 3 years 
Log average 
expenditure 
within 3 years 
Log population   
within 3 years 
Power capital 0.125 0.0801 0.0163 -0.0111 -0.0110 0.0104 
[0.0548]** [0.0469]* [0.0236] [0.0344] [0.0274] [0.0122] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune 
Observations 1,239 1,239 1,242 1,023 1,023 1,012 
R-squared 0.694 0.736 0.810 0.764 0.783 0.973 
Note: This table relates native officials’ promotion to a home commune’s new infrastructure in different groups, and other commune 
characteristics. Each observation is a connected commune in a year (2002, 2004, 2006, or 2008). Controls include commune’s log average 
income per capita, log population, and geographical zone, with commune and year fixed effects. All columns report OLS regressions on power 
capital measured as total positions accumulated by native officials. Different infrastructure outcomes in columns (1) to (3) are measured within 
3 years. Productive infrastructures include electricity, clean water supply in dry season, clean water supply in wet season, irrigation system, 
and marketplace (5 categories). Cultural infrastructures include post office, radio station, and cultural center (3 categories). Education and 
health infrastructures include pre-school, middle school, high school, and hospital (4 categories). Commune characteristics in columns (4) to 
(6) are measured in the first subsequent survey. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune level unless indicated otherwise. 
Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table 3. Results are robust to alternative specifications 
Dependent variable: Total infrastructures within 3 years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Power capital 0.358 0.349 0.193 0.137 0.187 0.216 0.164 
[0.135]*** [0.116]*** [0.0942]** [0.0613]** [0.0617]*** [0.0963]** [0.0795]** 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Province x 
Year 
District x 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Trends Province trends 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune Province District Commune 
Sample Baseline; excluding 2002 
Baseline; 
less developed 
Baseline; 
more developed Full sample Baseline Baseline Baseline 
Observations 945 525 712 8,463 1,237 1,237 1,237 
R-squared 0.800 0.724 0.649 0.762 0.440 0.802 0.788 
Note: This table relates native officials’ promotion to a home commune’s new infrastructure. Each observation is a commune in a year (2002, 
2004, 2006, or 2008 for columns (2) to (7) and 2004, 2006, or 2008 for columns (1), (8), and (9)). Controls include commune’s log average 
income per capita, log population, and geographical zone. All columns report OLS regressions in level, with infrastructure outcomes measured 
within 3 years and power capital measured as total positions accumulated by native officials. Columns (1) to (4) explore using different 
samples, with commune and year fixed effects. Column (1) excludes 2002 from the baseline sample. Columns (2) to (3) split the baseline 
sample into subsamples of communes with less or more than 6 categories of infrastructures observed in 2004. Column (4) uses the full sample 
of all surveyed rural communes that also includes non-connected communes. Columns (5) to (7) explores different fixed effects, including 
province and year fixed effects in column (5), district and year fixed effects in column (6), and commune and year fixed effects with province 
trends in column (7). Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune level unless indicated otherwise. Statistical significance is 
denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Panel B:  Comparison between different types of positions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: 
Infrastructures within 3 years Total Productive Cultural 
Education & 
health Total Productive Cultural 
Education & 
health 
Power capital from 
CPV’s Central Committee 0.154 0.109 0.0125 0.0237 
[0.150] [0.109] [0.0690] [0.0448] 
National Assembly 0.0636 0.00208 0.0761 -0.00764 
[0.128] [0.0924] [0.0899] [0.0454] 
Executive branch 0.471 0.260 0.171 0.0287 
[0.135]*** [0.0886]*** [0.0830]** [0.0359] 
Top-ranking positions -0.0887 -0.0199 -0.118 0.0261 
[0.322] [0.259] [0.135] [0.103] 
Executive branch & CPV 
middle-ranking positions  
0.352 0.204 0.112 0.0275 
[0.0943]*** [0.0668]*** [0.0529]** [0.0258] 
National Assembly 
middle-ranking positions 
0.0770 0.0107 0.0862 -0.0116 
[0.131] [0.0938] [0.0918] [0.0445] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Commune & 
Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune 
Observations 1,237 1,239 1,239 1,242 1,237 1,239 1,239 1,242 
R-squared 0.762 0.696 0.738 0.810 0.762 0.696 0.738 0.810 
Note: This table relates native officials’ promotion to a home commune’s new infrastructure in different groups, and other commune 
characteristics. Each observation is a connected commune in a year (2002, 2004, 2006, or 2008). Controls include commune’s log average 
income per capita, log population, and geographical zone, with commune and year fixed effects. All columns report OLS regressions in level, 
with infrastructure outcomes measured within 3 years and power capital measured as total positions accumulated by native officials. Panel A 
reports benchmark regression results using power capital accumulated by native officials in different government branches, including National 
Assembly and non-National Assembly positions (columns (1) and (2)), executive branch (i.e. central and provincial governments) and non-
executive branch positions (columns (3) and (4)), middle-ranking positions in the executive branch and CPV (i.e. deputy ministers, provincial 
government, and ordinary non-Politburo non-chaired members of the CPV’s Central Committee) (column (5)), and middle-ranking positions 
in the National Assembly (i.e. ordinary non-chaired members) (column (6)). Differences of coefficients are tested against zero using 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. In Panel B, columns (1) to (4) report “horserace” regression results among power capital accumulated by 
native officials in different government branches (i.e. CPV’s Central Committee, National Assembly, and executive branch). Columns (5) to 
(8) of Panel B report “horserace” regression results among power capital accumulated by native officials of different rankings (i.e. top-ranking 
positions, middle-ranking positions in the executive branch or CPV, and middle-ranking positions in the National Assembly). Robust standard 
errors in brackets are clustered at commune level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table 5. Impacts on infrastructures across different types of positions 
Panel A: Main results 
Dependent variable: Total infrastructures within 3 years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Source of power capital 
National 
Assembly 
positions 
Non-National 
Assembly 
positions 
Executive branch 
positions 
Non-executive 
branch positions 
Executive branch 
& CPV 
middle-ranking 
positions 
National 
Assembly 
middle-ranking 
positions 
Power capital 0.0307 0.309 0.471 0.100 0.348 0.0314 
[0.135] [0.0948]*** [0.133]*** [0.0930] [0.0944]*** [0.135] 
p-value of difference 0.038** 0.010***  0.025** 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune 
Observations 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 
R-squared 0.756 0.761 0.762 0.756 0.762 0.756 
Table 6. Increased commune power capital does not affect infrastructures in neighboring communes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Matched commune’s infrastructures Home district’s infrastructures 
Dependent variable: 
Infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Total Productive Cultural Education & health 
Non-connected 
commune 
average 
Non-connected 
commune 
total 
Source of power capital All positions Executive branch 
Middle-
ranking All positions All positions All positions All positions All positions
Home commune's 
power capital 
-0.0292 -0.0220 -0.0446 -0.0378 0.00397 0.00349 
[0.0668] [0.120] [0.0904] [0.0425] [0.0417] [0.0177] 
Home district’s 
power capital 
0.00131 0.00729 
[0.0256] [0.0951] 
Commune/district controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune pair & Year 
Commune 
pair & Year 
Commune 
pair & Year 
Commune 
pair & Year 
Commune 
pair & Year 
Commune 
pair & Year 
District & 
Year 
District & 
Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune District District 
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,201 1,201 1,057 1,057 
R-squared 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.686 0.712 0.772 0.862 0.983 
Corresponding 
baseline estimate 
0.227 0.471 0.348 0.125 0.0801 0.0163 
[0.0746]*** [0.133]*** [0.0944]*** [0.0548]** [0.0469]* [0.0236] 
p-value of difference vs. 
baseline estimate 0.0064*** 0.0022*** 0.0010*** 0.0116** 0.2000 0.6136 
Note: This table examines the effect of native officials’ promotions on infrastructure construction in home district. Controls include 
commune’s or district’s log average income per capita, log population, and geographical zone, with commune and year fixed effects. All 
columns report OLS regressions in level, with infrastructure outcomes measured within 3 years and power capital measured as total positions 
accumulated by native officials. Columns (1) to (6) consider pairwise matches between a connected home commune and its most similar rural 
non-connected commune in the same home district, defined by the shortest Mahalanobis distance based on predetermined variables (see text 
for details). Matched commune’s infrastructure outcomes are regressed on  home commune’s power capital, controlling for commune-pair 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Differences of coefficients are tested against zero using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. In columns (7) 
and (8), each observation is a connected district in a year. Power capital is the total power capital of all communes in the district (surveyed or 
not), and infrastructure outcomes are measured as the average or total infrastructures among the districts’ surveyed non-connected rural 
communes. District and year fixed-effects are included. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune or district level as 
indicated. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table 7. Effects on infrastructures are different by income, traditional value, and governance 
Dependent variable: Total infrastructures within 3 years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
By family value By average income per capita By local governance quality 
Sample Stronger value districts 
Weaker value 
districts Poorer communes Richer  communes 
Higher local 
governance 
quality provinces 
Lower local 
governance 
quality provinces 
Power capital 0.364 0.0752 0.274 0.146 0.0837 0.340 
[0.107]*** [0.0975] [0.112]** [0.0991] [0.0982] [0.0944]*** 
Difference of 
coefficients 
0.289 0.129 -0.256 
[0.145]** [0.149] [0.136]* 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune Commune 
Observations 600 613 589 579 608 629 
R-squared 0.742 0.778 0.773 0.742 0.737 0.780 
Note: This table relates native officials’ promotion to a home commune’s new infrastructure across different subsamples of communes. Each 
observation is a connected commune in a year (2002, 2004, 2006, or 2008). Controls include commune’s log average income per capita, log 
population, and geographical zone, with commune and year fixed effects. All columns report OLS regressions in level, with infrastructure 
outcomes measured within 3 years and power capital measured as total positions accumulated by native officials. Columns (1) and (2) use 
subsamples of communes in districts with stronger and weaker family values (measured by the income share of domestic remittance and 
worship expenditure in 2002). Columns (3) and (4) use subsample of communes with below and above median average income per capita in 
2002. Columns (5) and (6) use subsamples of communes in provinces with higher and lower local governance quality (computed from first 
PCI survey in 2006, see text for details). Differences of coefficients are tested against zero in regressions with interaction terms. Robust 
standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Figure 1. Impact of native officials’ promotions on total infrastructures in home communes over time 
Note: This figure shows the impact of native officials’ promotions on hometown infrastructure categories over time. The 
dependent variable is commune infrastructures within one year. Each point denotes a coefficient of the number of new 
native official promotions in years t+1, t, t-1, t-2, and the accumulated power capital up to year t-3. Controls include 
commune’s log average income per capita, log population, and geographical zone, and commune and year fixed effects. 
Figure 2. Impact of native officials’ promotions on total infrastructures by home commune characteristics 
Local linear regression results and 95% confidence intervals 
Note: The graphs present semi-parametric estimates of the heterogeneous effect of native officials’ promotion on home 
commune’s new infrastructure, as a function of the percentile on the X axis. The semiparametric estimation uses a Gaussian 
kernel function of the X-axis variable, with a bandwidth of 25% of the range (details in the Appendix.) 
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One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: 
Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime 
QUOC-ANH DO, KIEU-TRANG NGUYEN, AND ANH N. TRAN 
Online Appendix Not Intended for Publication 
I. Data Appendix 
This appendix describes the data, sources, and variables used in "One Mandarin 
Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," 
(Do, Nguyen and Tran). 
Data on Ranking Officials 
We collect data on four groups of ranking officials: (1) Communist Party's 
Central Committee members, (2) Central Government officials, (3) Provincial 
Government officials, and (4) National Assembly's members. For each official, 
we record his position, its begin and end years, his year of birth, and the commune 
of his patrilineal hometown. One official can appear multiple times in the dataset 
if he held multiple positions or the same position in multiple terms during the 
period from 2000 to 2011. 
Data on Central Committee members come from the official website of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) <http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/index_e.html>. 
The data cover all members of the 9
th
 Central Committee (2002-2006) and the 10
th
Central Committee (2007-2011). 
Data on Central and Provincial Government officials come from the 2000's, 
2004's, and 2009's Yearbooks of Administrative Organizations, published by the 
Ministry of Interior Affairs. The data cover all officials starting from the rank of 
deputy minister (Central Government) and vice chair of Provincial People's 
2 
Committees (Provincial Government). However, we only include Provincial 
Government officials whose patrilineal hometowns are in the same provinces as 
their positions. These officials represent 70% of total Provincial Government 
officials.      
Data on National Assembly members come from the Vietnam National 
Assembly's official website <http://www.na.gov.vn/htx/English/C1330/ 
#0TwLzt4Nw9UO>. The data cover all members of the 11
th
 National Assembly
(2003-2007) and the 12
th
 National Assembly (2008-2011).
Finally, we exclude 4 top positions in the country from the dataset to focus on 
the pervasiveness of favoritism beyond the top. These 4 positions are the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the Prime Minister, the President, 
and the Chairman of the National Assembly. 
Power Capital Variables 
𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍 adds up all ranking positions by terms (excluding the above 
top 4 positions)
1
 ever held by native officials connected to a commune (in
commune-level regressions) or a district (in district-level regressions) between 
2000 and the year of observation. An official is considered connected to a 
commune (district) if his patrilineal origin is in the commune (district). In 
Vietnam, a person’s patrilineal origin is legally recorded, shown on the identity 
card, and needs not correspond to his birthplace or residence. 
𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒍  is the total number of ranking positions by terms 
(excluding the top 4 positions) currently held by native officials in the year of 
observation. 
1 As discussed earlier, we also exclude Provincial Government officials whose patrilineal hometowns are in not the 
same provinces as their positions. 
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𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝑪𝑷𝑽  (power capital from CPV’s Central Committee 
positions) is constructed in the same way as 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, but includes only 
ranking positions in the CPV’s Central Committee (excluding the Secretary of the 
CPV). 
 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒕  (power capital from Executive branch positions) is 
constructed in the same way as 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 , but includes only ranking 
positions in Central and Provincial Governments (excluding the Prime Minister 
and the President). 
𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝑵𝑨  (power capital from National Assembly positions) is 
constructed in the same way as 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, but includes only positions in the 
National Assembly (excluding the Chairman of the National Assembly). 
𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝑻𝒐𝒑𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌  (power capital from top-ranking positions) is 
constructed in the same way as 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, but includes only positions at 
least equivalent to the rank of minster (but below the top 4). These positions 
comprise Deputy Prime Ministers, Vice Presidents, and ministers in the Central 
Government, and Politburo members and commission chairs in the CPV’s Central 
Committee. 
𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝑴𝒊𝒅𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒕𝑪𝑷𝑽 (power capital from Executive branch 
and CPV middle-ranking positions) is constructed in the same way as 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, but includes only positions below the rank of minister in Central 
and Provincial Governments and the CPV. These positions comprise deputy 
ministers in the Central Government, chairs and vice chairs of Provincial People's 
Committees, and regular (non-Politburo, non-chaired) members of the CPV’s 
Central Committee. 
𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝑪𝒂𝒑𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒍_𝑴𝒊𝒅𝑹𝒂𝒏𝒌𝑵𝑨  (power capital from National Assembly 
middle-ranking positions) is constructed in the same way as 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, but 
includes only ordinary non-chaired positions in the National Assembly. 
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𝑵𝒆𝒘𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓  is the total number of new ranking positions held by native 
officials in the year of observation (i.e. positions with terms starting in the year of 
observation). Note that 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡 − 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑡−1. 
Data on Commune Characteristics and Infrastructures 
We obtain data on commune characteristics and infrastructures from the 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). The VHLSS, technically 
supported by the World Bank, is conducted every two years (2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, and 2010) at both commune and household levels from a random, 
representative sample of about 2,200 communes out of about 11,000 communes 
in the country. The commune survey is conducted with several commune 
officials, while the household survey is conducted with a random sample of 
households in the commune. The VHLSS covers a total of more than 4,000 
communes across its 5 waves. 
We extract data from both surveys, including commune characteristics (i.e. 
area, population, average household income, average household expenditure, 
geographical zone, rural/urban classification) and presence and quality of various 
types of infrastructure in the communes (i.e. utilities, irrigation systems, market 
places, post offices, radio stations, cultural centers, schools, clinics/hospitals). 
Finally, we only keep communes classified as rural in the dataset, so as to avoid 
the complexity of infrastructure development in urban areas. 
Commune Infrastructure Variables 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓𝒄𝒕 (commune total infrastructures within 3 years) is the total 
number of all infrastructure categories ever present in commune 𝑐 in survey years 
𝑡 and 𝑡 + 2 (i.e. two consecutive waves of the VHLSS.) That is, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 =
∑ 𝐷3𝑦𝑟𝑘𝑐𝑡𝑘  where 𝐷3𝑦𝑟𝑘𝑐𝑡 is a binary indicator of presence of infrastructure k in
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commune c in either survey year t or survey year t+2. The 12 possible 
infrastructure categories are electricity, clean water supply in dry season, clean 
water supply in wet season, irrigation system, market place, post office, radio 
station, cultural center, pre-school, middle school, high school, and hospital.
2
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟏𝒚𝒓𝒄𝒕 (commune total infrastructures within 1 year) is the total number 
of all infrastructures categories present in commune 𝑐 in survey year 𝑡. That is, 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠1𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷1𝑦𝑟𝑘𝑐𝑡𝑘  where 𝐷1𝑦𝑟𝑘𝑐𝑡  is a binary indicator of presence of
infrastructure k in commune c in survey year t. 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠1𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 is not available for 
2002 as only 4 out of the above 12 infrastructure categories are covered in the 
2002 survey. 
𝑵𝒆𝒘𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓𝒄𝒕 (commune total new infrastructures within 3 years) is the 
total number of new infrastructure categories present in commune 𝑐  in survey 
year 𝑡 + 2 . An infrastructure category is considered new if it is present in 
commune 𝑐 in survey year 𝑡 + 2 but not in survey year 𝑡. 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 is not 
available for 2002 as only 4 out of the above 12 infrastructure categories are 
covered in the 2002 survey. 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒓𝒗𝒄,𝒕𝟏,𝒕𝟐  (commune infrastructure improvement) is a binary
indicator of improvement in the total number of all infrastructures present in 
commune 𝑐  in survey year 𝑡2  over that in survey year 𝑡1  (𝑡1  <  𝑡2) . That is, 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑣𝑐,𝑡1,𝑡2 = 1(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠1𝑦𝑟𝑐,𝑡2 > 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠1𝑦𝑟𝑐,11).
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓_𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆  (productive infrastructures within 3 years) is 
constructed in the same way as 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟 , but includes only productive 
infrastructure categories. These 5 possible infrastructure categories are electricity, 
clean water supply in dry season, clean water supply in wet season, irrigation 
system, and marketplace. 
2
 Besides these 12 infrastructure categories, VHLSS also covers primary school and clinic, which we do not include in 
our infrastructure measures due to the lack of variation. The 2002 survey covers only 4 out of 12 mentioned infrastructure 
categories (electricity, clean water supply in dry season, clean water supply in wet season, and hospital). The 2004, 2006, 
2008, and 2010 surveys cover all 12 mentioned infrastructure categories.   
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𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓_𝑪𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 (cultural infrastructures within 3 years) is constructed 
in the same way as 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟 , but includes only cultural infrastructure 
categories. These 3 possible infrastructure categories are post office, radio station, 
and cultural center.  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓_𝑬𝒅𝒖𝑯𝒆𝒂𝒍𝒕𝒉 (education and health infrastructures within 3 years) 
is constructed in the same way as 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟, but includes only education and 
health infrastructure categories. These 4 possible infrastructure categories are pre-
school, middle school, high school, and hospital. 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓_𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕  (aggregation of z-scores of infrastructures within 3 
years) is defined as ∑
𝐷3𝑦𝑟𝑘𝑐𝑡
√Var(𝐷3𝑦𝑟𝑘)
𝑘  where the variance is taken over (𝑐, 𝑡) for each 
infrastructure 𝑘. 
District Infrastructure Variables 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓_𝑵𝑪𝑨𝒗𝒈𝒅𝒕  (district’s non-connected commune average 
infrastructures within 3 years) is the average of all available 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡  in 
which 𝑐  is a rural non-connected commune in district 𝑑 . A non-connected 
commune is one that does not have any native official with ranking position 
during our study period. 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓_𝑵𝑪𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍𝒅𝒕  (district’s non-connected commune total 
infrastructures within 3 years) is the sum of all available 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 in which 𝑐 
is a rural non-connected commune in district 𝑑. 
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒓𝒂𝒔𝟑𝒚𝒓_𝑨𝒍𝒍𝑨𝒗𝒈𝒅𝒕 (district’s per-commune average infrastructures within 
3 years) is the average of all available 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡  in which 𝑐  is a rural 
commune in district 𝑑. 
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Other Variables 
𝑭𝒂𝒎𝒊𝒍𝒚𝑽𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆  is the ratio of domestic remittances and worship 
expenditure over household income in 2002, averaged over surveyed households 
in the same district. The amount of domestic remittances a household receives, the 
amount it spends on worship, and the household’s total income are extracted from 
VHLSS household survey. 
𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍𝑮𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 aggregates relevant questions/sub-scores included 
in the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Indices (PCI) 2006. The PCI is a set of 
indices of industries’ governance perceptions that has been systematically 
constructed from surveys of enterprises based in each province. It is the result of a 
country-wide project conducted since 2006 by the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, with the help from the UNDP. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
is calculated based on 7 questions/sub-scores: 
1. Length of business registration in days
2. Land access sub-score (on a scale of 10)
3. Security of land tenure sub-score (on a scale of 10)
4. Equity and consistency of policy application sub-score (on a scale of 10)
5. Share of firms agreeing to the statement “Officials use compliance with
local regulations to extract rents”
6. Share of firms agreeing to the statement “There is no discretionary
initiatives at provincial level”
7. Share of firms agreeing to the statement “Legal system provides
mechanism for firms to appeal officials’ corrupt behavior”
Specifically, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = −(1) + (2) + (3) + (4) − (5) ×
10 + (6) × 10 + (7) × 10.  Higher 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒  indicates less 
corrupted and more transparent local governance. 
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II. A simple conceptual framework
Existing economic theory has analyzed favoritism in auctions (Laffont and 
Tirole 1991, Burguet and Perry 2007), in the labor market (Prendergast and Topel 
1996, Duran and Morales 2011) and in queuing for public resources (Batabyal 
and Beladi 2008). Ethnicity (Burgess et al 2011), gender (Abrevaya and 
Hamermesh 2012) and social pressure (Garicano, Palacios and Prendergast 2005) 
have been considered as bases for favoritism. In this section, we present a simple 
model to illustrate how hometown-based favoritism works, and predict how 
officials’ power and motives shape the outcomes of this type of favoritism. 
The model involves a sequential game between two utility-maximizing agents, 
the Official and the Budget Allocator.
3
 The Official corresponds to newly
promoted officials with special links to their place of origin. The Allocator refers 
to the government unit that has authority over budget allocations to communes, 
namely the district budget authority in our context. The Official cares about 
getting additional resource allocation for his commune, which often comes in the 
form of additional budget infrastructure projects such as roads, markets, schools 
and clinics. These additional resources can benefit the Official in two ways: by 
providing him with additional political support from his home commune/district, 
as observed in the case of pork-barrel politics, and by appealing to his social 
preferences to improve the welfare of his commune/district of origin and his 
remote relatives living there.  
Let λ denote the administrative level of the place of birth. λ can be commune, 
district or province. A higher λ means a larger administrative level, with more 
potential to provide political support but less social affection from the Official. 
The model allows for the comparison of different λ’s (commune versus district) to 
gain insight into the Official’s motivation. 
3
 For expositional convenience, we refer to the official as male and the local authority as female. 
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To achieve his objective, the Official has to work out a deal with the Allocator, 
who has direct control over budget allocation. The Official can give the Allocator 
certain favors, such as political promotion, that enhance the Allocator’s utility by 
P, at a cost g for the Official. In return, the Allocator will channel an additional 
amount B from the budget to the Official's hometown’s infrastructure projects, at 
a cost h for the Allocator. This favored allocation B is valued by the Official at 
(B,λ) + (B,λ), where  represents the utility from additional political support
and  represents the utility from social preference satisfaction. We pay particular 
attention to B, as it manifests explicit evidence of favoritism between the Official 
and Allocator. 
We assume that the Official’s cost function g(P,r) is increasing and convex in P 
and decreasing in r, where r represents the Official's power such that higher r 
implies higher power. Next, the Allocator’s cost function h(B,d) is increasing and 
convex in B and increasing in d, where d measures institutional constraints on the 
Allocator's discretion. We further assume that (B,λ) and (B,λ) are both 
increasing and concave in B.
4
The Official is the first mover and makes an offer to the Allocator involving 
(P,B). The Allocator will accept if it satisfies his participation constraint, namely 
that the benefit of accepting is not lower than the cost. As the first mover, the 
Official can fully appropriate the game’s rent by making an offer such that the 
Allocator is indifferent as to whether to accept or refuse it. The offer then solves 
the following maximization problem: 
Max(P,B)  (B,λ) + (B,λ) - g(P, r) s.t. P - h(B,d)  0. (1) 
4
 We assume that the costs of direct monetary transfers between the two agents are much higher than the costs of 
providing favor, so monetary transfers, or bribes, are not realistic options. In practice, exchanges of both bribes and favors 
may coexist. We refrain from modeling explicit bribes because it would not add insight to our empirical setup. 
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We will now state three propositions about the existence, distribution and 
motives of favoritism. These propositions provide the basis for the subsequent 
empirical investigation presented in this paper. 
Proposition 1: Assume that (A1): 'B(0,λ) + 'B(0,λ) - g'P(h(0,d),r)h'B(0,d) > 0. 
There exists a unique solution (P*,B*) to this model, with positive favored 
allocation B*>0, determined by the following equations: 
'B(B*,λ) + 'B(B*,λ) - g'P(h(B*,d),r)h'B(B*,d) = 0   (2), P* = h(B*,d).
Intuitively, this proposition shows that if there is positive net marginal benefit 
of favored allocation B at 0, then a positive level of favoritism will occur. As a 
result, even in an authoritarian regime where the electoral motivation is absent, if 
the marginal social motivation is sufficiently large then favoritism will arise. 
Proposition 2: (a) Assume that (A2a) the marginal cost g'P is decreasing in r, 
then the favored allocation B* is increasing in r; (b) Assume that (A2b) the 
marginal cost h'B is increasing in d, then the favored allocation B* is decreasing in 
d. 
Result (a) implies that a higher-powered official can exercise more favoritism 
for his home commune. This relation allows us understand the power structure in 
a political system through observing the favoritism of different officials. Notice 
that what matters is the cross derivative of g with respect to P and r, and not the 
first derivative of g with respect to r. A higher-ranked official can get a better deal 
because P and r are complements. Result (b) implies that favoritism is more 
widespread when local authorities are less constrained in making deals, typically 
under low quality of local governance. 
Proposition 3: If the marginal benefits 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) are increasing 
(decreasing) in λ (A3), then the favored allocation B* is increasing (decreasing) in 
λ. 
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This result shows that the effect of administrative level λ on the value of 
favored allocation essentially depends on its effect on the marginal benefits. As 
discussed previously, it is realistic to assume that at a larger administrative level, 
social preferences become less important and political motivation more important. 
At a larger level, social connections arguably become less frequent or salient, so 
the improved utility derived from more favored allocation is less valuable, i.e. 
'B(B,λ) decreases when λ increases. On the other hand, a larger level is more 
politically influential, so additional favored allocation can potentially bring more 
benefit, i.e. 'B(B,λ) increases when λ increases. Overall, our prior on the effect of 
λ on the total marginal benefit, namely 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ), depends on whether 
social preferences or political influences are more dominant. Empirically, 
evidence that B* is increasing in λ is consistent with 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) being 
increasing in λ, in which case the social preference effect through 'B must have 
dominated the political motivation effect through 'B. 
We can also consider the special case where the Official is the same as the 
Budget Allocator, political favor exchange becomes irrelevant and the Official 
only has to pick B to maximize his net gain of (B,λ) + (B,λ) - h(B,d). This 
problem has a unique solution B* that satisfies 'B(B*,λ) + 'B(B*,λ) - h'B(B*,d) = 
0 (as 'B(B,λ) and 'B(B,λ) are both decreasing in B while h'B(B,d) is increasing). 
As in propositions 2 and 3 above, this unique solution B* increases when d is 
lower (assuming that h'B is increasing in d) and when 'B(B,λ) is higher for every 
value of B. 
This model provides a simple framework for understanding favoritism under 
various political systems. In institutional environments with strong governance 
and high accountability, both g'P (the Official's marginal cost to grant political 
favor) and h'B (the Allocator's marginal cost to distort the local budget) are 
prohibitively high. The resulting amount of budget distorted by favoritism B* is 
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then minimal, if at all. This applies to strong democracies as well as non-
democratic regimes with a well-functioning system of checks and balances on the 
majority of officials, such as Singapore’s – the lack of political incentives in those 
regimes, i.e. low 'B, may further dampen favoritism. In effect, it suffices to raise 
either g'P or h'B, i.e. either the accountability of high-rank officials or that of local 
administrative units, to curb B*. 
The model also shows that while evidence of favoritism from heads of state 
such as Colonel Gaddafi or President Félix Houphouët-Boigny abounds, it is 
unclear whether favoritism can be widespread beneath the top dictators in these 
contexts. A strong dictator may only tolerate his own favoritism and punish his 
coordinates’; this is a case of g'P=0 for the dictator, but very high for everyone 
else. In such cases, democratization and/or decentralization could increase ' and 
lower h'B, both leading to more widespread favoritism. For that reason, favoritism 
may also be found in democratic countries, such as in certain cases in the U.S. or 
India where the marginal cost g'P is low. 
The model’s application to an authoritarian setting yields key empirical 
predictions on the effects of officials’ promotions on home commune 
infrastructure, a manifestation of favored budget allocation. First, because of a 
lack of checks and balances, the marginal costs g'P and h'B are expected to be low 
in Vietnam, so the phenomenon of hometown favoritism is predicted to be 
widespread among officials, even beyond the top leaders (Hypothesis I). Second, 
hometown favoritism depends positively on the official’s power in the 
authoritarian hierarchy and on the home province’s local governance quality 
(Hypothesis II). Third, hometown favoritism is most present where the 
attachment between the official and the hometown is strongest. We expect that the 
marginal social preference 'B is close to zero for communes aside from the home 
commune and that 'B for the home district is diluted to a much lower level than 
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that of the home commune. Therefore, favoritism is predicted to decrease as we 
move from the home commune to neighboring communes or to the home district 
(Hypothesis III). While marginal political interest 'B may be slightly higher at 
the district level, we do not expect it in practice to be of a relevant magnitude (as 
districts barely matter in Vietnamese politics). 
III. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: The Lagrangian of this optimization problem, (B,λ) + 
(B,λ) - g(P, r) - [P - h(B,d)], implies the first order conditions: 
'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) + h'B(B,d) = 0 and -g'P(P,r) -  = 0.
The participation constraint is binding as P = h(B,d). 
These conditions yield: 
'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) - g'P(h(B,d),r)h'B(B,d) = 0.
This equation has a unique solution B* because the left-hand side's derivative 
with respect to B is negative, as: 
''BB(B,λ) < 0, ''BB(B,λ) < 0, and g''PP(h(B,d),r)[h'B(B,d)]
2
 +
g'P(h(B,d),r)h''B(B,d)  > 0. 
The Lagrangian is concave in (P,B) because its Hessian matrix is negative 
definite. Therefore, (h(B*,d),B*) is the unique solution to this optimization 
problem under constraint. Furthermore, since the left-hand side of this equation is 
positive when B=0, the result of favored allocation B* must be positive (QED). 
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) The partial differentiation with respect to r from 
equation (2) yields: 
''BB(B*,λ)B*'r + ''BB(B*,λ)B*'r =
[g''PP(P*,r)h'B(B*,d)B*'r  + g''Pr(P*,r)]h'B(B*,d) + g'P(P*,r)h''BB(B*,d)B*'r 
 {''BB(B*,λ) + ''BB(B*,λ) - g''PP(P*,r)[h'B(B*,d)]
2
 -  g'P(P*,r)h''BB(B*,d)}B*'r
= g''Pr(P*,r)h'B(B*,d). 
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The expression in the bracket on the left-hand side is negative while the right-
hand side is positive as g''Pr(P*,r) < 0 based on the proposition's assumption. 
Therefore, B*'r must be positive, indicating that the solution B* is increasing in r 
(QED). 
(b) The partial differentiation with respect to d from equation (2) yields: 
''BB(B*,λ)B*'d + ''BB(B*,λ)B*'d =
g''PP(P*,r)[h'B(B*,d)B*'d + h'd(B*,d)]h'B(B*,d) + g'P(P*,r)[h''BB(B*,d)B*'d + 
h''Bd(B*,d)] 
 {''BB(B*,λ) + ''BB(B*,λ) - g''PP(P*,r)[h'B(B*,d)]
2
 - g'P(P*,r)h''BB(B*,d}B*'d
= 
g''PP(P*,r)h'd(B*,d)h'B(B*,d) + g'P(P*,r)h''Bd(B*,d). 
The expression in the bracket on the left-hand side is negative while the right-
hand side is positive as h''Bd(B*,d) > 0 based on the proposition's assumption. 
Therefore, B*'d must be negative, indicating that the solution B* is decreasing in d 
(QED.) 
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose the marginal benefits are decreasing in λ, as 
in the case where social preferences outweigh political supports (the opposite case 
is proven analogously.) Let λ1 < λ2, so 'B(B,λ1) + 'B(B,λ1) ≥ 'B(B,λ2) + 
'B(B,λ2) for every B, and B1* and B2* be the corresponding solutions. We now
need to show that B1* ≥ B2*. 
Recall from equation (2) that : 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) = g'P(h(B,d),r)h'B(B,d). 
Denote this expression as M(B). 'B(B,λ) + 'B(B,λ) is decreasing in B as + is 
concave in B, while M(B) is increasing in B as g and h are convex.  
Assume that B1* < B2*, then M(B1*) = 'B(B1*,λ1) + 'B(B1*,λ1) ≥ 'B(B1*,λ2) + 
'B(B1*,λ2) ≥ 'B(B2*,λ2) + 'B(B2*,λ2) = M(B2*), contradictory to M(B)’s
increasing in B. Therefore, B1* ≥ B2* (QED). 
15 
IV. Semi-parametric method used for Figure 1
We modify the benchmark empirical regression in section IV.B to model the 
heterogeneous effect of officials’ promotions on infrastructure improvements as a 
function 𝛽(. ) of a baseline variable xc: 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽(𝑥𝑐)𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾(𝑥𝑐)𝑿𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡(𝑥𝑐) + 𝜇𝑐(𝑥𝑐) + 𝜀𝑐𝑡
Figure 2 plots the estimated function 𝛽(𝑥𝑐)  for three different baseline
variables, namely the percentiles of family value measure, income per capita, and 
local governance quality. The function 𝛽(𝑥𝑐) is estimated from semi-parametric
local linear regressions of the outcome variable 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑠3𝑦𝑟𝑐𝑡 at each value of xc, 
weighted by a Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 25% of the total range of xc, 
on the treatment variable 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1, including controls and fixed effects 
as in the benchmark regression. The observed pattern is much similar across a 
wide range of cross-validated bandwidths (see Li and Racine 2006, ch. 2.) To 
provide an example, in Figure 2’s first plot we divide the range of the family 
value measure into a 100-point grid, run a local linear regression with Gaussian 
kernel weight at each of these points, using all controls and fixed effects in the 
benchmark regression in Table 2A, and then report the estimated coefficient of 
𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑐,𝑡−1 as a point on the graph. 
V. Inference based on Monte Carlo simulations 
To further verify the statistical inference of our benchmark results, we show in 
Figure A2 results from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations in which each commune’s 
power capital is drawn randomly from the baseline-sample power capital 
distribution. We then estimate the effect of this “random” power capital on real 
commune infrastructures using the same baseline specification as in column 1 of 
Table 2 in each simulation. As expected, the distribution of the resulting estimates 
centers around zero, confirming that power capital should not have any impact on 
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commune infrastructures when there is no real linkage between the two. On the 
other hand, our baseline estimated effect of 0.227 is at the 99.9
th
 percentile of this
distribution, indicating that the impact we find is unlikely to be spurious but 
reflects a causal relationship between native official promotions and home 
commune infrastructure. 
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Table A1. Increased commune's power capital improves infrastructures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Specification OLS in level equation Conditional logit model Negative binomial model OLS in level equation 
Dependent variable 
Aggregation of z-scores 
of infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Change in total 
infrastructures 
Change in total 
infrastructures 
Total infrastructures 
within 1 year 
Power capital 0.608 
[0.199]*** 
Change in power capital 0.333 0.201 
[0.170]* [0.0749]*** 
New power t+1 -0.00858 
[0.147] 
New power t -0.0604 
[0.125] 
New power t-1 0.147 
[0.151] 
New power t-2 0.319 
[0.220] 
Power capital t-3 0.243 
[0.167] 
Commune controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year Province & Year Province & Year Commune & Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune 
Observations 1,237 722 728 941 
R-squared 0.757 
Note: This table relates native officials’ promotion to a home commune’s new infrastructure. Each observation is a connected commune in a 
year. Controls include commune’s log average income per capita, log population, and geographical zone. Column (1) follows Table 2’s 
column (1), using Kling et al.’s (2007) aggregation of z-scores as the outcome variable (footnote 22 in the main text). Columns (2) and (3) 
respectively report the conditional logit model and the negative binomial model (footnotes 18 and 19 in the main text). Column (4) reports the 
regression that produces Figure 1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at commune level. Statistical significance is denoted by *** 
(p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Table A2. Increased commune power capital does not affect infrastructures in neighboring communes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample Non-connected communes in home district All other communes in home district Home district 
Dependent variable Total infrastructures within 3 years Total infrastructures within 3 years 
Per-commune average 
total infrastructures 
within 3 years 
Source of power capital All positions Executive branch Middle-ranking All positions All positions 
Home commune’s 
power capital 
0.00553 -0.00882 -0.000501 0.00804 
[0.00563] [0.00603] [0.00733] [0.00493] 
Home district’s 
power capital 
0.0202 
[0.0214] 
Observation unit Commune x Year Commune x Year Commune x Year Commune x Year District x Year 
Commune/district controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed effects Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year Commune & Year District & Year 
Cluster Commune Commune Commune Commune District 
Observations 16,539 16,539 16,539 21,165 1,521 
R-squared 0.759 0.759 0.759 0.756 0.815 
Note: This table extends Table 6 on the effect of native officials’ promotions on infrastructure construction in home district. Controls include 
commune’s or district’s log average income per capita, log population, and geographical zone, with commune and year fixed effects. All 
columns report OLS regressions in level, with infrastructure outcomes measured within 3 years and power capital measured as total positions 
accumulated by native officials. Columns (1) to (3) consider non-connected rural communes in the same home district. Column (4) uses all 
other communes in home district (including other connected communes), and column (5) uses the measure of average total infrastructures per 
commune in the home district. Commune or district and year fixed-effects are included. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at 
commune or district level as indicated. Statistical significance is denoted by *** (p < 1%), ** (p < 5%), and * (p < 10%). 
Figure A1.  Commune total infrastructures and power capital distributions 
Note: Distributions of number of categories of infrastructures by commune, and of accumulated number of native 
officials from the commune. 
Figure A2. Actual versus simulated beta coefficients 
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Note: Monte Carlo simulated beta coefficients of the effect of power capital on hometown infrastructures, where each 
simulation every commune’s power capital is sampled randomly from the baseline power capital distribution. The red 
line marks the actual beta coefficient, and its p-value with respect to the simulated distribution. 
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